J.S.ミル
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
カントにおいて理論化された、個人の自律(「自由=自己決定」)説と、功利主義において理論化された、結果重視の経験主義とを総合し、
妥当な自由主義社会の理論を提示したのが、J.S.ミルである。
その『自由論』は、彌爾著・中村正直訳『自由之理』として明治五年(1872)に出版され、明治期以降の日本の自由民権運動にも大きな影響を及ぼした。
A) 自由主義の原理
個人には可能な限り多くの自由が与えられ、個人の自由は最大限に尊重されるべきだが、
それによって社会が成立するためには、いくつかの条件が必要である。
人間が他の人間の自由を正当な根拠をもって制限しうるのは、「自己防衛(self-protection)」という目的の場合だけである。
「誰でも、自分の行為において、社会に従わなければならない部分は、他人に関わりのある部分だけである。
自分自身だけに関わる部分においては、彼の独立は、当然、絶対的である。
個人は自分自身に対しては、すなわち自分自身の精神と身体に対しては、その主権者なのである。」
(『自由論』第1章)
1)意識という内面の領域
「最も広い意味での、良心の自由。思考と感情の自由。
現実的および理論的な、科学的、道徳的、宗教的な、すべての問題についての意見と感情の絶対的自由。」
2)好み(tastes)および目的追求(pursuits)の自由
「自分の行為によってもたらされる結果を自分で引き受けるかぎり、」(=「自己責任」)
「我々の行うことが我々の同朋を害しないかぎり、」(=「他者危害の原則」)
「たとえ人が我々の行為を愚かであるとか、頑固でひねくれているとか、間違っているとか、考えようとも、」(=「愚行権?」)
「他人から邪魔されずに、自分の好きなように、自分の性格にあった生活を計画設計する自由がある。」
3)個人間の団結(combination)の自由
「他人に危害を及ぼさないかぎり、いかなる目的のためにも団結することも自由でなければならない。」
(同上)
B) 功利主義
能力 | 善の定義 | 行為の動機 | 行為の評価 | 刑罰 | |
カント | 理性 | 善い意志 | 道徳法則への尊敬 | 目的(結果は二次的) | 厳罰主義 |
功利主義 | 感覚 | 幸福(=快楽の総体) | 快楽と苦痛 | 結果主義 | 宥和主義 |
カントの義務倫理とベンサムの功利主義は、(ストア派とエピクロス派のように)、多くの点で、逆の立場に立っている。
その水と油のようなカントの思想を、功利主義の中に持ち込んだのが、ミルの功利主義である。
(それは、一回的な行為ではなく、行為の基づく規則(ルール)を問題にするから、ベンサムのような「行為功利主義」ではなく、「規則功利主義」であるとも言われる。)
1)ベンサムの功利主義の踏襲
「功利性(*)、すなわち最大幸福の原理、を道徳の基礎として受け入れる信条は、行為は幸福を促進するのに比例して正しく、幸福に反することを生み出すのに比例して悪である、と主張する。幸福とは、快楽および苦痛の欠如を意味し、不幸とは、苦痛および快楽の喪失を意味する。」(『功利主義』第2章)
(*)「功利性」は「utility」の訳。「(人間に)役に立つ」という意味からは、「実用主義」と訳したほうが近いだろうが、「実用主義」は「pragmatism」の訳語として定着しているので、それは、無理。ならば、「効用主義」の方が訳語としてはよいかもしれない。ともかく「功利主義」という訳語は、誤解を招きやすく、宜しくない。
2)快楽の質的差異とカント的理想主義の導入
ベンサムは、「幸福と満足という、全く違う観念を混同している。」
だから「豚の快楽主義」だと非難される。
快楽主義は飲食や性的快楽など感覚的な快楽を重視する立場だと思われがちだが、ベッドの上でスイッチを押すと脳に快楽物質が流れ快楽を感じる<快楽機械>(というものがあるとして、これ)に繋がれたまま人生を過ごすことを望む人はいない。
夏の暑い日に炎天下で野球の試合をするなんて苦痛以外の何物でもないかもしれないが、
野球が好きな高校生なら、甲子園で試合をしたくない選手はいないだろう。
人間が本当に幸福を感じるのは、豚のように食べて寝ている時ではなく、自分の持っている高い能力を実現した時である。
それもまた快楽であるとするなら、快楽には質的な相違があることを認めなければならない。
そして、どちらにより高い価値があるかは、両方を経験した者には、自ずから明らかである。
「ある種の快楽は、他の種類の快楽よりも望ましく価値があるという事実を認めることは、功利性の原理と完全に両立しうる。」
より高い能力を行使する生活様式の優位
品位・尊厳(dignity)の重視
「満足した豚であるよりは、満足しない人間である方がよい。満足した愚か者であるよりは、満足しないソクラテスである方がよい。」
人間は理想(や向上心)を持つからこそ、現状に不満を持つのであり、それこそが人間的な価値である。
Excerpts from;
J.S.Mill: Utilitarianism(1863)
Chapter 2
What Utilitarianism Is.
A PASSING remark is all that needs be given
to the ignorant blunder of supposing that
those who stand up for utility as the test
of right and wrong, use the term in that
restricted and merely colloquial sense in
which utility is opposed to pleasure. An
apology is due to the philosophical opponents
of utilitarianism, for even the momentary
appearance of confounding them with any one
capable of so absurd a misconception; which
is the more extraordinary, inasmuch as the
contrary accusation, of referring everything
to pleasure, and that too in its grossest
form, is another of the common charges against
utilitarianism: and, as has been pointedly
remarked by an able writer, the same sort
of persons, and often the very same persons,
denounce the theory "as impracticably
dry when the word utility precedes the word
pleasure, and as too practicably voluptuous
when the word pleasure precedes the word
utility."
Those who know anything about the matter
are aware that every writer, from Epicurus
to Bentham, who maintained the theory of
utility, meant by it, not something to be
contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure
itself, together with exemption from pain;
and instead of opposing the useful to the
agreeable or the ornamental, have always
declared that the useful means these, among
other things. Yet the common herd, including
the herd of writers, not only in newspapers
and periodicals, but in books of weight and
pretension, are perpetually falling into
this shallow mistake.
Having caught up the word utilitarian, while
knowing nothing whatever about it but its
sound, they habitually express by it the
rejection, or the neglect, of pleasure in
some of its forms; of beauty, of ornament,
or of amusement. Nor is the term thus ignorantly
misapplied solely in disparagement, but occasionally
in compliment; as though it implied superiority
to frivolity and the mere pleasures of the
moment. And this perverted use is the only
one in which the word is popularly known,
and the one from which the new generation
are acquiring their sole notion of its meaning.
Those who introduced the word, but who had
for many years discontinued it as a distinctive
appellation, may well feel themselves called
upon to resume it, if by doing so they can
hope to contribute anything towards rescuing
it from this utter degradation.
The creed which accepts as the foundation
of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness
Principle, holds that actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness,
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse
of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure,
and the absence of pain; by unhappiness,
pain, and the privation of pleasure.
To give a clear view of the moral standard
set up by the theory, much more requires
to be said; in particular, what things it
includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure;
and to what extent this is left an open question.
But these supplementary explanations do not
affect the theory of life on which this theory
of morality is grounded-- namely, that pleasure,
and freedom from pain, are the only things
desirable as ends; and that all desirable
things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian
as in any other scheme) are desirable either
for the pleasure inherent in themselves,
or as means to the promotion of pleasure
and the prevention of pain.
Now, such a theory of life excites in many
minds, and among them in some of the most
estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate
dislike. To suppose that life has (as they
express it) no higher end than pleasure--
no better and nobler object of desire and
pursuit--they designate as utterly mean and
grovelling; as a doctrine worthy only of
swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus
were, at a very early period, contemptuously
likened; and modern holders of the doctrine
are occasionally made the subject of equally
polite comparisons by its German, French,
and English assailants.
When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always
answered, that it is not they, but their
accusers, who represent human nature in a
degrading light; since the accusation supposes
human beings to be capable of no pleasures
except those of which swine are capable.
If this supposition were true, the charge
could not be gainsaid, but would then be
no longer an imputation; for if the sources
of pleasure were precisely the same to human
beings and to swine, the rule of life which
is good enough for the one would be good
enough for the other.
The comparison of the Epicurean life to that
of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely
because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy
a human being's conceptions of happiness.
Human beings have faculties more elevated
than the animal appetites, and when once
made conscious of them, do not regard anything
as happiness which does not include their
gratification.
I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans
to have been by any means faultless in drawing
out their scheme of consequences from the
utilitarian principle. To do this in any
sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as
Christian elements require to be included.
But there is no known Epicurean theory of
life which does not assign to the pleasures
of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination,
and of the moral sentiments, a much higher
value as pleasures than to those of mere
sensation. It must be admitted, however,
that utilitarian writers in general have
placed the superiority of mental over bodily
pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency,
safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former--
that is, in their circumstantial advantages
rather than in their intrinsic nature.
And on all these points utilitarians have
fully proved their case; but they might have
taken the other, and, as it may be called,
higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle
of utility to recognise the fact, that some
kinds of pleasure are more desirable and
more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating
all other things, quality is considered as
well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures
should be supposed to depend on quantity
alone.
If I am asked, what I mean by difference
of quality in pleasures, or what makes one
pleasure more valuable than another, merely
as a pleasure, except its being greater in
amount, there is but one possible answer.
Of two pleasures, if there be one to which
all or almost all who have experience of
both give a decided preference, irrespective
of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer
it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently
acquainted with both, placed so far above
the other that they prefer it, even though
knowing it to be attended with a greater
amount of discontent, and would not resign
it for any quantity of the other pleasure
which their nature is capable of, we are
justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment
a superiority in quality, so far outweighing
quantity as to render it, in comparison,
of small account.
Now it is an unquestionable fact that those
who are equally acquainted with, and equally
capable of appreciating and enjoying, both,
do give a most marked preference to the manner
of existence which employs their higher faculties.
Few human creatures would consent to be changed
into any of the lower animals, for a promise
of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures;
no intelligent human being would consent
to be a fool, no instructed person would
be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and
conscience would be selfish and base, even
though they should be persuaded that the
fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better
satisfied with his lot than they are with
theirs. They would not resign what they possess
more than he for the most complete satisfaction
of all the desires which they have in common
with him. If they ever fancy they would,
it is only in cases of unhappiness so extreme,
that to escape from it they would exchange
their lot for almost any other, however undesirable
in their own eyes. A being of higher faculties
requires more to make him happy, is capable
probably of more acute suffering, and certainly
accessible to it at more points, than one
of an inferior type; but in spite of these
liabilities, he can never really wish to
sink into what he feels to be a lower grade
of existence.
We may give what explanation we please of
this unwillingness; we may attribute it to
pride, a name which is given indiscriminately
to some of the most and to some of the least
estimable feelings of which mankind are capable:
we may refer it to the love of liberty cs
one of the most effective means for the inculcation
of it; to the love of power, or to the love
of excitement, both of which do really enter
into and contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is
a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form
or other, and in some, though by no means
in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the
happiness of those in whom it is strong,
that nothing which conflicts with it could
be, otherwise than momentarily, an object
of desire to them.
Whoever supposes that this preference takes
place at a sacrifice of happiness-- that
the superior being, in anything like equal
circumstances, is not happier than the inferior--
confounds the two very different ideas, of
happiness, and content. It is indisputable that the being whose
capacities of enjoyment are low, has the
greatest chance of having them fully satisfied;
and a highly endowed being will always feel
that any happiness which he can look for,
as the world is constituted, is imperfect.
But he can learn to bear its imperfections,
if they are at all bearable; and they will
not make him envy the being who is indeed
unconscious of the imperfections, but only
because he feels not at all the good which
those imperfections qualify.
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied
than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are a different
opinion, it is because they only know their
own side of the question. The other party
to the comparison knows both sides.
It may be objected, that many who are capable
of the higher pleasures, occasionally, under
the influence of temptation, postpone them
to the lower. But this is quite compatible
with a full appreciation of the intrinsic
superiority of the higher. Men often, from
infirmity of character, make their election
for the nearer good, though they know it
to be the less valuable; and this no less
when the choice is between two bodily pleasures,
than when it is between bodily and mental.
They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury
of health, though perfectly aware that health
is the greater good.
It may be further objected, that many who
begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything
noble, as they advance in years sink into
indolence and selfishness. But I do not believe
that those who undergo this very common change,
voluntarily choose the lower description
of pleasures in preference to the higher.
I believe that before they devote themselves
exclusively to the one, they have already
become incapable of the other. Capacity for
the nobler feelings is in most natures a
very tender plant, easily killed, not only
by hostile influences, but by mere want of
sustenance; and in the majority of young
persons it speedily dies away if the occupations
to which their position in life has devoted
them, and the society into which it has thrown
them, are not favourable to keeping that
higher capacity in exercise.
Men lose their high aspirations as they lose
their intellectual tastes, because they have
not time or opportunity for indulging them;
and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures,
not because they deliberately prefer them,
but because they are either the only ones
to which they have access, or the only ones
which they are any longer capable of enjoying.
It may be questioned whether any one who
has remained equally susceptible to both
classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and
calmly preferred the lower; though many,
in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual
attempt to combine both.
From this verdict of the only competent judges,
I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a
question which is the best worth having of
two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence
is the most grateful to the feelings, apart
from its moral attributes and from its consequences,
the judgment of those who are qualified by
knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that
of the majority among them, must be admitted
as final. And there needs be the less hesitation
to accept this judgment respecting the quality
of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal
to be referred to even on the question of
quantity.
What means are there of determining which
is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest
of two pleasurable sensations, except the
general suffrage of those who are familiar
with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are
homogeneous, and pain is always heterogeneous
with pleasure. What is there to decide whether
a particular pleasure is worth purchasing
at the cost of a particular pain, except
the feelings and judgment of the experienced?
When, therefore, those feelings and judgment
declare the pleasures derived from the higher
faculties to be preferable in kind, apart
from the question of intensity, to those
of which the animal nature, disjoined from
the higher faculties, is suspectible, they
are entitled on this subject to the same
regard.
I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary
part of a perfectly just conception of Utility
or Happiness, considered as the directive
rule of human conduct. But it is by no means
an indispensable condition to the acceptance
of the utilitarian standard; for that standard
is not the agent's own greatest happiness,
but the greatest amount of happiness altogether;
and if it may possibly be doubted whether
a noble character is always the happier for
its nobleness, there can be no doubt that
it makes other people happier, and that the
world in general is immensely a gainer by
it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only
attain its end by the general cultivation
of nobleness of character, even if each individual
were only benefited by the nobleness of others,
and his own, so far as happiness is concerned,
were a sheer deduction from the benefit.
But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity
as this last, renders refutation superfluous.
Excerpts from;
J.S.Mill: On Liberty (1859)
Chapter 1
Introductory
The object of this Essay is to assert one
very simple principle, as entitled to govern
absolutely the dealings of society with the
individual in the way of compulsion and control,
whether the means used be physical force
in the form of legal penalties, or the moral
coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for
which mankind are warranted, individually
or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number,
is self-protection. That the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral,
is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully
be compelled to do or forbear because it
will be better for him to do so, because
it will make him happier, because, in the
opinions of others, to do so would be wise,
or even right. These are good reasons for
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with
him, or persuading him, or entreating him,
but not for compelling him, or visiting him
with any evil in case he do otherwise. To
justify that, the conduct from which it is
desired to deter him, must be calculated
to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one,
for which he is amenable to society, is that
which concerns others. In the part which
merely concerns himself, his independence
is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over
his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign.
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that
this doctrine is meant to apply only to human
beings in the maturity of their faculties.
We are not speaking of children, or of young
persons below the age which the law may fix
as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who
are still in a state to require being taken
care of by others, must be protected against
their own actions as well as against external
injury. For the same reason, we may leave
out of consideration those backward states
of society in which the race itself may be
considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties
in the way of spontaneous progress are so
great, that there is seldom any choice of
means for overcoming them; and a ruler full
of the spirit of improvement is warranted
in the use of any expedients that will attain
an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism
is a legitimate mode of government in dealing
with barbarians, provided the end be their
improvement, and the means justified by actually
effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle,
has no application to any state of things
anterior to the time when mankind have become
capable of being improved by free and equal
discussion. Until then, there is nothing
for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar
or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate
as to find one. But as soon as mankind have
attained the capacity of being guided to
their own improvement by conviction or persuasion
(a period long since reached in all nations
with whom we need here concern ourselves),
compulsion, either in the direct form or
in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance,
is no longer admissible as a means to their
own good, and justifiable only for the security
of others.
It is proper to state that I forego any advantage
which could be derived to my argument from
the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent
of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal
on all ethical questions; but it must be
utility in the largest sense, grounded on
the permanent interests of man as a progressive
being. Those interests, I contend, authorize
the subjection of individual spontaneity
to external control, only in respect to those
actions of each, which concern the interest
of other people. If any one does an act hurtful
to others, there is a prima facie case for
punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties
are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the
benefit of others, which he may rightfully
be compelled to perform; such as, to give
evidence in a court of justice; to bear his
fair share in the common defence, or in any
other joint work necessary to the interest
of the society of which he enjoys the protection;
and to perform certain acts of individual
beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature's
life, or interposing to protect the defenceless
against ill-usage, things which whenever
it is obviously a man's duty to do, he may
rightfully be made responsible to society
for not doing. A person may cause evil to
others not only by his actions but by his
inaction, and in either case he is justly
accountable to them for the injury. The latter
case, it is true, requires a much more cautious
exercise of compulsion than the former. To
make any one answerable for doing evil to
others, is the rule; to make him answerable
for not preventing evil, is, comparatively
speaking, the exception. Yet there are many
cases clear enough and grave enough to justify
that exception. In all things which regard
the external relations of the individual,
he is de jure amenable to those whose interests
are concerned, and if need be, to society
as their protector. There are often good
reasons for not holding him to the responsibility;
but these reasons must arise from the special
expediencies of the case: either because
it is a kind of case in which he is on the
whole likely to act better, when left to
his own discretion, than when controlled
in any way in which society have it in their
power to control him; or because the attempt
to exercise control would produce other evils,
greater than those which it would prevent.
When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement
of responsibility, the conscience of the
agent himself should step into the vacant
judgment seat, and protect those interests
of others which have no external protection;
judging himself all the more rigidly, because
the case does not admit of his being made
accountable to the judgment of his fellow-creatures.
But there is a sphere of action in which
society, as distinguished from the individual,
has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending
all that portion of a person's life and conduct
which affects only himself, or if it also
affects others, only with their free, voluntary,
and undeceived consent and participation.
When I say only himself, I mean directly,
and in the first instance: for whatever affects
himself, may affect others through himself;
and the objection which may be grounded on
this contingency, will receive consideration
in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region of
human liberty.
It comprises, first, the inward domain of
consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience,
in the most comprehensive sense; liberty
of thought and feeling; absolute freedom
of opinion and sentiment on all subjects,
practical or speculative, scientific, moral,
or theological. The liberty of expressing
and publishing opinions may seem to fall
under a different principle, since it belongs
to that part of the conduct of an individual
which concerns other people; but, being almost
of as much importance as the liberty of thought
itself, and resting in great part on the
same reasons, is practically inseparable
from it.
Secondly, the principle requires liberty
of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan
of our life to suit our own character; of
doing as we like, subject to such consequences
as may follow: without impediment from our
fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does
not harm them, even though they should think
our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong.
Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual,
follows the liberty, within the same limits,
of combination among individuals; freedom
to unite, for any purpose not involving harm
to others: the persons combining being supposed
to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.
No society in which these liberties are not,
on the whole, respected, is free, whatever
may be its form of government; and none is
completely free in which they do not exist
absolute and unqualified. The only freedom
which deserves the name, is that of pursuing
our own good in our own way, so long as we
do not attempt to deprive others of theirs,
or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each
is the proper guardian of his own health,
whether bodily, or mental and spiritual.
Mankind are greater gainers by suffering
each other to live as seems good to themselves,
than by compelling each to live as seems
good to the rest.
Though this doctrine is anything but new,
and, to some persons, may have the air of
a truism, there is no doctrine which stands
more directly opposed to the general tendency
of existing opinion and practice.