「プレゼント」（訪米第１号）に対する高すぎる「お返し」（対中対決戦略全面加担）
－アーミテージ報告のシナリオどおりに展開する日米関係－
日本の真珠湾攻撃・日米開戦(１２月８日)の前日に当たる２０２０年１２月７日に発表された５回目のアーミテージ報告(以下「報告」)は、間もなく(２０２１年１月２０日)発足しようとするバイデン政権と２０２０年９月１６日に発足したばかりの菅政権を強く意識した、それまでの４回の報告と比較しても格段に政治的メッセージ性の強い性格のものです。そのことは、「日本のリーダーシップを奨励し、より対等な同盟から最大限の価値を引き出す」ために、「日本のリーダーシップの役割を維持しようとする菅義偉首相の努力を熱烈に支持し、ジョー・バイデン大統領と最も早く会談する訪問者の一人になるよう奨励」するという、これまでの報告では見たこともない露骨なまでに生々しい「提言」を冒頭の＜序文＞においていることに端的に表れています。そして、第３回までの報告に見られない今回の報告の最大の特徴は「対中対決戦略」を中心かつ全面に据えたことです(トランプ政権時代に出された第４回目の報告も対中警戒感の表明があった)。ということは、「バイデン大統領が招待する最初の外国の首脳」という「栄誉」を菅首相に与え、その「見返り」にアメリカの対中対決戦略に対する日本の全面的コミットメントを引き出すことに最大の狙いがあるということです。
これまでのアーミテージ報告の作成にかかわったこともあるカート・キャンベルは１月１３日に「インド太平洋調整官」というバイデン政権のアジア戦略の要のポストに早々と起用されました。彼が就任後の最初にして最重要の仕事として、報告が生々しく提案した「菅首相訪米」の実現を推進したであろうことは誰にも容易に想像がつくことです。
アーミテージとともに報告作成の中心人物であるジョセフ・ナイの「前歴」も想起することが必要です。ナイは、１９９６年の日米安保共同宣言及び日米新防衛ガイドライン作成による安保「再定義」への動きを起動させた、いわゆる「ナイ・イニシアティヴ」の中心人物です。両者は２０００年の第１回目の報告以来、一貫して日本が集団的自衛権行使に踏み込むことを要求してきました。今回の報告では、「第９条の解釈変更を実現した」安倍首相の「功績」を手放しで賞賛しています。
今回の報告は、「(日米) 同盟にとって最大の安全保障上の課題は中国」と明言し、「中国の圧力の増加は、日米両国が台湾との政治的・経済的な関わり方において、より一層の協力を必要としている」と強調しています。バイデン・菅「共同声明」が台湾海峡に言及したのは、菅首相がバイデン政権の下での最初の外国首脳受け入れであったことと合わせ、菅訪米が報告のシナリオどおりに進められたことを物語っています。
忌々しいのは、「知日派」（アーミテージ、ナイ、キャンベル）が日本の保守政治家の薄っぺらな虚栄心を読み切って、「最初の外国首脳受け入れ」という「餌」を菅首相の目の前にぶら下げ、菅首相はまんまとその「餌」に食いついて浅ましい虚栄心をさらけ出し、これまた彼らの読みどおりに、アメリカ側の法外な「見返り」要求、すなわちバイデン政権の対中対決戦略に前後の見境もなく飛びついたことでした。アーミテージ以下の面々が「してやったり」と高笑いしている情景が目に浮かびます。
報告は「今後数年間の同盟の最重要任務」として、「共通の枠組みを創設し、優先順位と実施を調整すること」を掲げ、「アメリカの外圧の時代から日本のリーダーシップへの大きな転換」を提起しています。その最初に上げられているのが台湾問題でした。その次に「北朝鮮」が挙げられていますが、そこで優先するのは「核武装した北朝鮮をいかにして封じ込めるかを考えること」です。５月には文在寅大統領の訪米が予定されていますが、報告は早くも朝鮮に対する強硬アプローチを示唆しているのです。その後には、中国及びロシアが強い警戒感を示している「ミサイル防衛」が挙げられ、さらに日本の防衛予算の少なさ（「中国が拡大する人民解放軍の予算のほんの少しに過ぎない」）を問題視します。さらに、「シックス・アイズのネットワーク」(米英豪加NZとの情報共有)に向けた努力、ホスト・ネーション・サポート協定(いわゆる「思いやり」予算協定)、「クアッド」が続きます。アメリカの日本に対する要求はまさに「とどまるところを知らない」貪欲さです。
以上の日米協力案件をスムーズに進めていく上での重要課題として、報告は「特に重要なのは、日本と韓国の間の緊張が続いていること」を挙げ、「(日韓) 双方は、過去ではなく未来に焦点を当てる必要がある」と指摘します。菅首相に続いて文在寅大統領の訪米が進められていますが、バイデン政権の意図が奈辺にあるかは容易に想像することができます。残る任期が一年を切った文在寅大統領は、朝鮮半島の平和と安定の促進に不可欠な米朝対話再開を呼びかけています(４月２１日付けのニュー・ヨーク・タイムズが掲載したインタビューでの発言)。しかし、バイデン政権は自らが設定しつつある「対北朝鮮戦略」の中に文在寅大統領を引き入れることを狙っている可能性が高いと言うべきでしょう。日韓関係もそういう方向での転換が望ましいと考えており、バイデン政権は文在寅政権が菅政権に歩み寄ることを狙っていると見られます。有り体に言えば、バイデン政権としては米日韓関係において日本側の「肩を持つ」ことでさらに日本に「恩を売る」ことを通じて、日本がこれまで以上に「アメリカの計算どおりに動く」ようになることを目論んでいると見られます。
報告は「結論」部分で、「より対等な日米同盟を構築すること」が重要と強調しています。しかしそのホンネは、「日本は、あらゆる面で米国の利益と価値観に最も沿った同盟国である」という指摘です。「豚もおだてりゃ木に登る」と言いますが、アメリカの言う「対等な日米同盟」の本質は、「(アメリカと)対等」という言葉に有頂天になる日本がアメリカの敷くレールの上を従来にも増して忠実に走り続けることを確保することにあると言って過言ではないと思います。菅首相訪米はその第一歩だったと言えるでしょう。
しかし、今のバイデン・アメリカはかつての自信に満ちたアメリカではもはやありません。衰退への道を確実に歩んでいるアメリカであり、バイデン政権はなりふり構わず「昔の栄光」を回復しようとあがこうとしている、アメリカの利益のためには手段を選ばず、関係諸国を犠牲にすることもまったくためらわない、実に危険な政権です。直近の端的な例がインドです。４月２６日のコラムでも指摘したように、中国との対決のためにインドを引き入れるのに必死になるのもバイデン政権ならば、コロナ禍で助けを求めるインドを冷淡に突き放すのも同じバイデン政権なのです(国際的批判の前にインド支援の姿勢を示しましたが、インドが必要とするレベルからはかけ離れたジェスチャーにすぎません)。「今日のインドは明日の日本」という可能性は十分あると考えてバイデン・アメリカの対日アプローチに臨まなければならないと思います。私たち主権者は、菅政権の対米のめり込みは愚かである以上に危険極まりないものであることを認識し、菅政権のこれ以上の暴走に待ったをかけなければなりません。
(参考１) 第１回～第５回のアーミテージ報告のタイトル
2000年："The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership"（森政権）
米国と日本：成熟したパートナーシップに向けて
2007年："The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020"（安倍政権）
米日同盟：2020年に向けアジアを正しく方向付ける
2012年："The U.S.-Japan Alliance：anchoring stability in Asia"（野田政権）
米日同盟：アジアに安定を定着させる
2018年："Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century"（安倍政権）
21世紀のための米日同盟を更新する
2020年："The U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2020：an Equal Alliance with a Global Agenda"（菅政権）
2020年の米日同盟：グローバル・アジェンダを伴う平等の同盟
(参考２) 第５回アーミテージ報告本文
"The U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2020：an Equal Alliance with a Global Agenda"
December 7, 2020
At this time of great uncertainty and rapid change, the United States and Japan face extraordinary challenges. These include an unrelenting pandemic, rising nationalism and populism, global economic turmoil, multiple technological revolutions, and renewed geopolitical competition. The U.S.-Japan alliance itself is one of the most important sources of stability and continuity in this period of great uncertainty, but there should be no doubt that together both countries must be prepared for a regional and world order under more stress than at any time in the last 70 years. This is the latest in a series of bipartisan "Armitage-Nye" reports that have assessed the state of the U.S.-Japan alliance and suggested a new agenda for the challenges and opportunities on the horizon. This current iteration has special importance because of shifting power dynamics in Asia and new expectations of Japan. Indeed, for the first time in its history, Japan is taking an equal, if not leading, role in the alliance. Developing a more equal U.S.-Japan alliance is critical to addressing both regional and global challenges. This report has identified issues that both allies should prioritize to advance their relationship as well as global security and prosperity.
Introduction
At this time of great uncertainty and rapid change, the United States and Japan face extraordinary challenges. These include an unrelenting pandemic, rising nationalism and populism, global economic turmoil, multiple technological revolutions, and renewed geopolitical competition. The U.S.-Japan alliance itself is one of the most important sources of stability and continuity in this period of great uncertainty, but there should be no doubt that together both countries must be prepared for a regional and world order under more stress than at any time in the last 70 years.
In Washington, the United States will meet these challenges with an incoming Biden administration and the prospect of a Republican-controlled Senate. Despite the potential for a divided government, there is strong reason to believe that the United States can move forward with a positive agenda for the U.S.-Japan alliance, as it is one of the key areas of bipartisan consensus.
This is the latest in a series of bipartisan "Armitage-Nye" reports that have assessed the state of the U.S.-Japan alliance and suggested a new agenda for the challenges and opportunities on the horizon. This current iteration has special importance because of shifting power dynamics in Asia and new expectations of Japan. Indeed, for the first time in its history, Japan is taking an equal, if not leading, role in the alliance: setting the regional agenda, championing free trade agreements and multilateral cooperation, and implementing new strategies to shape a regional order at a time when the United States has been unsteady. Encouraging Japanese leadership and getting the most value out of a more equal alliance is a critical task for leaders in both Washington and Tokyo.
Japan's more proactive stance can be attributed to two factors. First, Japan faces an increasingly harsh national security environment. Second, inconsistent leadership in the United States has empowered Japan to lead on strategic issues in Asia and the rest of the world.
Much of the credit for this transformation should go to former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. He realized a long-overdue reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution to allow Japan's right under the United Nations Charter to engage in collective self-defense and therefore embark on a new level of joint international security cooperation with the United States and other like-minded states. He led the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to completion. And he crafted a strategic framework for countering China's illiberal ambitions through his Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision.
Japan's innovative and dynamic regional leadership benefits the United States and the region. As such, the authors enthusiastically support Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga's efforts to maintain Japan's leadership role and encourage him to be one of the earliest visitors to meet with President Joe Biden. Public opinion polls show that trust in Japan has never been higher in the United States as well as in South and Southeast Asia. There was a time when Japanese initiative might have prompted concerns in Washington, but it is clear today that Japan's strategy aligns well with U.S. objectives. The United States and Japan share a set of common interests. But both countries also share a common set of values, which form the bedrock for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Despite fears of U.S. retrenchment, leading gauges of public opinion show consistent support for an active U.S. role in the world. Polls also reflect that the alliance remains popular in both countries.
The United States and Japan need each other more today than at any other time in their history. The two allies are perhaps the only countries in the world that are vital to all four strategic challenges—geostrategic, economic, technological, and governance—that are needed to manage China's rise and put in place a positive future vision across each of these domains. Developing a common framework and aligning priorities and execution should be the alliance's top mission in the years ahead.
Advancing the Security Alliance
Japan has become not just an essential and more equal ally but also an idea innovator. From the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept to networking regional partnerships, Tokyo is doing much of the thought work to push common values forward. As a result, the U.S.-Japan alliance is moving from interoperability to interdependence, as both sides increasingly need each other to respond not only to crises but also to long-term challenges. This is a major shift from the days of American gaiatsu to Japanese leadership.
The biggest security challenge for the alliance is China. Beijing's efforts to alter the status quo in Asia have heightened security concerns among most of China's neighbors. Demonstrating U.S. support for Japan's air and maritime activities, reaffirming that the U.S. Article 5 commitment extends to the Senkakus, and conducting joint planning to bolster military capacities in Japan's southwestern islands are key parts of the alliance response. But there is a broader challenge that must be addressed by the United States, Japan, and other like-minded nations: how to develop a new framework for competitive coexistence.
China's so-called "grey zone" coercion has illuminated the importance that the United States and Japan place on the strategic integrity of the first island chain, which stretches from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines to Malaysia. Japan does not have a legal or diplomatic obligation to support Taiwan's security as the United States does through the Taiwan Relations Act, but there should be no doubt that Tokyo shares Washington's concern over growing Chinese military and political pressure on Taiwan. This growing Chinese pressure calls for increased coordination between the United States and Japan on their respective political and economic engagement with Taiwan.
A second regional security concern is North Korea. After 25 years of unsuccessful diplomacy, it should be clear that denuclearization is unrealistic in the near term, though it remains a long-term goal. That does not mean the United States should shut the door to fresh approaches, but it does mean that the priority should be figuring out how to contain a nuclear North Korea by strengthening deterrence and defense in the face of new North Korean capabilities. The good news is that Kim Jong Un cares about regime survival; he is not suicidal. Therefore, deterrence and containment are possible, although they will not be easy. This should be a priority for both the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea alliances. It also underscores the imperative of enhancing U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral intelligence and defense cooperation.
These challenges call for greater coordination and devotion of more resources to regional security challenges. Yet, defense budgets are coming under more pressure in both Tokyo and Washington. This will put a premium on technology co-development and related efforts to increase the efficiency of alliance cooperation. Japan's military budget, now roughly $50 billion annually, has increased for six straight years as Tokyo realizes its "multi-domain defense force." A critical upcoming test is how Japan will pursue counterstrike capability and missile defenses, which should be part of a larger discussion within the alliance framework about respective roles, missions, and capabilities; bilateral and internal command and control relationships; and how these capabilities could contribute to regional peace and stability. Similarly, missile defenses can be useful, but the allies must work together to avoid overly expensive or duplicative investments that could impose undue costs on the alliance. The quality of Japanese improvements in capabilities will matter as much as quantity—but numbers will matter. Japan spends only 1 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, and while the total amount of Japan's defense budget now surpasses that of the United Kingdom, it remains a fraction of China's expanding budget for the People's Liberation Army.
Another opportunity for deeper cooperation would be the inclusion of Japan in the Five Eyes intelligence sharing network with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The United States and Japan should make serious efforts to move toward a Six Eyes network.
The United States and Japan today share power—power to enhance their alliance, to build regional cooperation, and to integrate the regional and global economies. It is this power sharing that matters, and discussions over how to better leverage the alliance should focus on this concept. Alliances are not burdens, and as the authors have argued, the U.S.-Japan alliance must now turn its attention and efforts to realizing a shared strategic vision. The United States must reset the conversation and conclude a Host Nation Support Agreement with Japan as soon as possible. Operationalizing strategic cooperation, bilaterally and across the region, should be the focus of U.S. attention looking forward.
Expanding Partnerships and Coalitions
The U.S.-Japan alliance must also be augmented with a number of other complementary and cooperative arrangements, both in the region and with like-minded states in Europe and beyond. A series of networked coalitions based on shared interests and values is critical to protecting common geostrategic, economic, technological, and governance objectives. These coalitions should aim to deter coercion and the use of force, renovate the international economic order, protect critical supply chains and information flows, and set global standards on emerging technologies that advance an updated rules-based order. The U.S.-Japan alliance should become the nucleus of this set of coalitions.
Over the past two decades, Beijing's activities have spurred new patterns of intra-Asian cooperation facilitated by Japanese and American support. Japan has enhanced bilateral and trilateral coordination with Australia and India, leading the Quad to take on a promising new role. If the Quad is to become a more integral part of the region's order, however, it will have to be inclusive to avoid overshadowing other regional institutions or coalitions. U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral policy coordination on North Korea continues to be critical to regional security. Unlike institutionalized fora, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, and East Asia Summit, these types of informal networks are centered on functionality, not process. Reinforcing this web of institutions is critical to protecting shared interests and values in Asia.
Washington and Tokyo will have to overcome several challenges in building these coalitions. Foremost among these is the continuing tension between Japan and South Korea. The United States needs its two allies in Northeast Asia to work together constructively and pragmatically on a variety of regional and global issues. They are both critical to addressing challenges, from North Korea to China, as well as setting broader economic, technological, and governance agendas. Both sides need to focus on the future, not the past. Consolidating Tokyo-Seoul relations strengthens U.S. bilateral ties with each ally. There are hints of incremental progress, which Prime Minister Suga and President Moon should seize as a critical opportunity for a fresh start. A near-term opening in this regard involves bilateral cooperation for the upcoming Olympics.
Working with Russia and China will be another challenge. Both Japanese and American leaders have learned that negotiations with counterparts in Moscow and Beijing can take much time but yield few tangible results. Nevertheless, defining modes of cooperation with these countries will be necessary to address a variety of regional and global challenges, from North Korea to climate change to pandemics.
Strengthening Economic and Technology Cooperation
Deepening U.S.-Japan economic and technology cooperation is fundamental to the alliance. Article II of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty calls on the two countries to "seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and . . . encourage economic collaboration between them." Absent a robust economic component—encompassing trade, technology, infrastructure, and energy—any strategy in the Indo-Pacific will be empty and unsustainable. Trade and technology rules, standards, and norms in the region are no less contested than in the South China Sea, and the United States and Japan are closely aligned on most of these issues. Space is another increasingly contested domain where the United States and Japan should intensify cooperation in both the civilian and military sectors. Moreover, as the Covid-19 pandemic underscores, both countries have a stake in trusted, secure supply chains, which are vital to sustaining prosperity and economic security in the region.
The United States should join the CPTPP to align with Japan as leaders in shaping economic rules. The political difficulties of joining are clear, but a larger risk to U.S. prosperity and security makes joining imperative. The November 15 signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a broad Asia-Pacific trade deal that does not include the United States, should be a wake-up call in Washington.
The CPTPP is an essential vehicle for the United States to recapture regional economic space and work with Japan to bolster leadership on economic rulemaking. Japan's bold gambit to salvage the original Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement after Trump's withdrawal in early 2017 was an important affirmation of the rules-based order. Tokyo structured the new agreement to facilitate the United States rejoining the accord. Although the new administration may reasonably expect changes to the CPTPP, these can be accommodated through negotiations with existing members—but first, Washington needs to indicate a willingness to join and have a seat at the table. In addition to the economic and strategic benefits to the United States, Japan, and other partners in the region, a CPTPP that included the United States would encompass over 40 percent of the global economy, giving its standards and norms global weight and leverage to coalesce with like-minded states for reform of the World Trade Organization.
One of the virtues of the CPTPP is its high standards in digital governance. Data is the oil of the twenty-first century economy, yet the internet is beginning to fragment into three digital regimes—led by the European Union, United States, and China. The disciplines in the CPTPP, which were further strengthened in the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the U.S.-Japan digital trade accord of September 2019, could be built upon to globalize rules and norms in this critical area. These include principles such as free cross-border flows of data, no customs duties on digital products, and no data localization requirements. Japan played an important leadership role in winning endorsement at the G20 Osaka Summit of a process to advance principles such as these in the World Trade Organization e-commerce negotiations. Washington and Tokyo could carry forward this work by mobilizing like-minded nations through the G7 and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) bodies to build consensus for a more cohesive system of data governance.
Meanwhile, new technologies—including artificial intelligence, robotics, biotechnology, nano-engineering, new materials, and 5G networking—are merging the digital and physical worlds and will drive economic growth and shape geopolitics in the decades ahead. The United States and Japan have a critical interest in collaborating to ensure that the technical standards and rules governing new technologies are open, inclusive, and promote interoperability.
This requires enhancing U.S.-Japan coordination in international standards-setting bodies such as the International Telecommunications Union to ensure that technical standards and norms governing key emerging technologies (e.g., 5G, the Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence) are compatible globally. With its "China Standards 2035" initiative, Beijing is seeking to shape new standards to favor Chinese technologies. The United States needs to up its game in international standards setting, working with Japan and others to foster more effective public-private partnerships.
5G is a key enabling technology in the twenty-first century knowledge economy, and the United States and Japan should prioritize joint work in this area. Both governments should facilitate private sector efforts to create alternatives to Huawei. Japan has been a leader in development of the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN), a software-based approach to 5G (and eventually 6G) that could be a cost-competitive and interoperable alternative to the vertical procurement model.
Another important area of Japan's leadership in the Indo-Pacific has been in regional infrastructure and economic development. Growing indications that China's Belt and Road Initiative is foundering on corruption, debt, and poor standards suggest an opportunity to shape viable, transparent infrastructure projects. In 2015, Tokyo established the $200 billion Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, which enshrines principles such as open procurement, environmental and debt sustainability, and transparency in infrastructure finance. Japan won G20 leaders' approval of these principles at the 2019 Osaka Summit. The new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, with an enhanced balance sheet and strategic mandate, should partner with the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank Group to address the $25 trillion in regional infrastructure needs to 2030. Coordinating these activities among Washington, Tokyo, and other key regional and extra-regional players, such as Australia and South Korea, will be an increasingly important role for leaders in both capitals. The United States and Japan should also expand assistance to recipient states to facilitate good governance and accountability so that decisions on infrastructure are made with full transparency.
Finally, energy and climate change are a vital dimension of the U.S.-Japan economic alliance. Prime Minister Suga's pledge that Japan's economy will be carbon-neutral by 2050, matched by a similar pledge by South Korea, underscores the urgency of scaling up clean energy. To meet its domestic and international commitments, Japan will need to curb use of and investments in coal. Building on nuclear and natural gas cooperation, the United States and Japan should expand their clean energy and climate partnerships. Priority clean energy technologies for joint development include hydrogen; battery storage (key to transportation electrification and scaling up renewables); carbon capture, storage, and recycling; and smart grids. These technologies hold promise for effective market-based climate change mitigation.
Conclusion
As outlined here, developing a more equal U.S.-Japan alliance is critical to addressing both regional and global challenges. Japan is the ally most aligned with U.S. interests and values across the board. In some areas, Japan has already taken the lead, promoting shared values, high standards, and liberal norms. Indeed, the United States would benefit from closer alignment with Tokyo's approach in a number of areas. The U.S.-Japan alliance is positioned to lead in the evolving multipolar world. This report has identified issues that both allies should prioritize to advance their relationship as well as global security and prosperity. The new administrations in Tokyo and Washington should rise to these challenges.