Kampagne für die Reform der Vereinten Nationen 2012

Movement for UN Reform 2012

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Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, Zweiter Band, Der Wanderer und sein Schatten

284   Das Mittel zum wirklichen Frieden. (1886) Keine Regierung gibt jetzt zu, dass sie das Heer unterhalte, um gelegentliche Eroberungsgelüste zu befriedigen; sondern der Verteidigung soll es dienen. Jene Moral, weiche die Notwehr billigt, wird als ihre Fürsprecherin angerufen. Das heißt aber: sich die Moralität und dem Nachbar die Immoralität vorbehalten, weil er angriffs- und eroberungslustig gedacht werden muss, wenn unser Staat notwendig an die Mittel der Notwehr denken soll; überdies erklärt man ihn, der genau ebenso wie unser Staat die Angriffslust leugnet und auch seinerseits das Heer vorgeblich nur aus Notwehrgründen unterhält, durch unsere Erklärung, weshalb wir ein Heer brauchen, für einen Heuchler und listigen Verbrecher, welcher gar zu gern ein harmloses und ungeschicktes Opfer ohne allen Kampf überfallen möchte. So stehen nun alle Staaten jetzt gegeneinander: sie setzen die schlechte Gesinnung des Nachbars und die gute Gesinnung bei sich voraus. Diese Voraussetzung ist aber eine Inhuma-nität, so schlimm und schlimmer als der Krieg: ja, im Grunde ist sie schon die Aufforderung und Ursache zu Kriegen, weil sie, wie gesagt, dem Nachbar die Immoralität unterschiebt und dadurch die feindselige Gesinnung und Tat zu provozieren scheint. Der Lehre von dem Heer als einem Mittel der Notwehr muss man ebenso gründlich abschwören als den Eroberungsgelüsten. Und es kommt vielleicht ein großer Tag, an welchem ein Volk, durch Kriege und Siege, durch die höchste Ausbildung der militärischen Ordnung und Intelligenz ausgezeichnet und gewöhnt, diesen Dingen die schwersten Opfer zu bringen, freiwillig ausruft: »wir zerbrechen das Schwert« — und sein gesamtes Heerwesen bis in seine letzten Fundamente zertrümmert. Sich wehrlos machen, während man der Wehrhafteste war, aus einer Höhe der Empfindung heraus, — das ist das Mittel zum wirklichen Frieden, welcher immer auf einem Frieden der Gesinnung ruhen muss: während der so genannte bewaffnete Friede, wie er jetzt in allen Ländern einhergeht, der Unfriede der Gesinnung ist, der sich und dem Nachbar nicht traut und halb aus Hass, halb aus Furcht die Waffen nicht ablegt. Lieber zugrunde gehn als hassen und fürchten, und zweimal lieber zugrunde gehn als sich hassen und fürchten machen, dies muss einmal auch die oberste Maxime jeder einzelnen staatlichen Gesellschaft werden! — Unsern liberalen Volksvertretern fehlt es, wie bekannt, an Zeit zum Nachdenken über die Natur des Menschen: sonst würden sie wissen, dass sie umsonst arbeiten, wenn sie für eine »allmähliche Herabminderung der Militärlast« arbeiten. Vielmehr: erst wenn diese Art Not am größten ist, wird auch die Art Gott am nächsten sein, die hier allein helfen kann. Der Kriegsglorien-Baum kann nur mit einem Male, durch einen Blitzschlag zerstört werden: der Blitz aber kommt, ihr wisst es ja, aus der Wolke und aus der Höhe. —

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Blockiert die  BRD die Entwicklung der Vereinten Nationen zu  einem  fähigen Instrument der Friedensicherung?

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Das Gesetz von der Umkehr der Tendenzen 

       

 

Japan and the Two Hague Peace Conferences,

1899 and 1907*

 

Klaus Schlichtmann, Sophia University, Tokyo

 

‘Problems of peace become at times more serious and perplexing than those of war.’ (Shidehara Kijûrô)

 

            The Historical Background

            Ronald P. Toby was the first Western author who in 1984 gave evidence that Japan during the so-called “seclusion” (sakoku) ‘was not nearly so isolated as it has hitherto been portrayed’ (Toby, 1984: 21[1]), an important fact that largely explains the country’s sudden emergence as a modern state. Basic for Japan’s international relations during the ‘Sakoku’ period was the tradi­tio­nal ‘kai model of interstate relations’ (Toby, 1984: 217)[2] that drew a distinguishing line between civili­zed countries like India, China and Japan,[3]ka[4], and uncivilized “barbaric” states, “i”.[5] [6] Both politically and economic­ally during the Edo period Japan continued to be an accountable partner in the strategic East Asian environment. The diplomatic and trade relations, strictly regulated by the Tokugawa-bakufu, constituted a farreaching information network.

           It is not surprising therefore that the significance of international law and its applicability for Japan was discussed and given careful consideration during the first two decades after the “opening” (kaikoku) of the country to the West – first as a ‘Way of the State as Moral-Being’, then as a ‘Shield of the Weak’, relating to the ‘Heaven-Bestowed Rights of Man’ (tempu jinken), and last as ‘Tool of the Strong’.[7] To the American consul Townsend Harris, who had arrived in Shimoda in 1856, ‘Japan was … undemocratic …, and uncivilized. To bring the heathen country under the “laws of nations” was his personal mission, reflecting the Manifest Destiny of the United States.”[8] In March 1868 Japan officially declared, that it would conduct its foreign affairs in accordance with public international law (bankoku kôhô).[9] Understanding and adopting bankoku kôhô was facilitated by traditional Confucian conceptions on the conduct of states. At the same time, however, considerations of statecraft (Staatsraison), made conscription necessary.[10] In the 1860s and 1870s several diplomatic missions, including the famous Iwakura Mission (Iwakura kengai shisetsu, 1871-1873) were sent to the capitals of the foreign powers in Europe and America, largely to effect a revision of the “unequal treaties”.[11]

            The failure of the Iwakura Mission[12] to achieve treaty revision confirmed and finalized the Japanese “change of heart” with regards to the previously held hope to obtain guarantees for Japan’s unhampered development, national security and independence on the basis of recognized principles of international law - a change of prospect which can clearly be seen in the volteface of Fukuzawa Yukichi with regards to this particular question.[13] The German Reichskanzler Bismarck had advised the Iwakura Mission on 15 March 1873 not to rely on international law but rather on the power of arms, as a guarantee, in its international relations. In 1878, after Darwinism had been introduced by Edward S. Morse in 1877,[14] Fukuzawa, the famous “publicist of modernization” published Tsûzoku kokkenron (What Every Man Should Know About the Rights of Nations) and describes the ‘law of nations’  in the following words:

                ‘To put it plainly, there are two Ways: to kill, or to be killed … this is the Way of every man. However, the Way of foreign intercourse does not differ in the slightest from this principle. “Treaties of Friendship and Commerce” and the “Law of Nations” (bankoku kôhô) are very beautiful phrases indeed, but they are merely polite veneer. The true principles of foreign intercourse are nothing more than to fight for power and to forage for profit …’

            Of course Fukuzawa was not a Darwinist, but he clearly realized the necessity of a strong Japan to defend its interests.[15] To understand Japan’s position at The Hague, this is an important premise to keep in mind.[16]

            Apart from that, Japanese participation in the first Hague Peace Con­fer­ence had been preceded by joining a number of international societies, such as the International Telegraphic Union in 1865, the Postal Union (Bern Convention) in 1877, and in 1886 the “Bern Agreement for the Protection of Works of Literature and Art” and the “International Red Cross Society”, etc. Thus, Alexander von Siebold saw Japan ‘entering the European diplomatic concert... (as it were) through the backdoor.’ (Siebold, 1900: 8)

            At Tokyo’s Imperial University (Tôkyô teikoku-daigaku oder Teidai), Alexander von Siebold reports, in the eighteen hundred-eighties, there was a well equipped Law Faculty. Obviously, Japan endeavoured to be recog­nized as a legal subject under the Law of Nations in the sense of the ius gentium, obtain “titles” and access to common goods and benefits under public interna­t­ional law and fully participate in the “comity of nations”. In this, however, a ‘basic and universal ingredient in the Japanese attitude to international relations’ was, after reports of China’s defeat in the 1842 Opium War by the British, ‘the fear of … conquest of the Far East’ by the Western nations ‘as a group of “outside countries” (gaikoku), or as individual nations competing among themselves’ (Miwa, 1968: 2), carrying their wars to Asia as had happened in the Seven-Years-War (1756-63).

 

            The Idea

            The modern concept of a peaceful organization of the nations and socie­ties into a legally responsible commu­nity, or feder­ated union, had developed mainly in Europe, but the basic idea existed in Asia, too. Thus, for example Mozi (Mo Tse, ca. 470-391 B.C.),[17] whose teachings con­siderably in­fluenced Taoist and Confucian thinking, seems very modern in his pursuit to medi­ate between the Chinese kings fighting each other during the times of the Warring States (403-221 B.C.). His own ideas of an “ideal state” and universal love (kenai) and equality had also reached Japan during the middle ages.

            Such was the aim of the Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907). As the German jurist Walther Schücking, the eminent professor of international law, neo-Kantian philosopher and parliamentarian (in the Weimar “Reichstag” from 1919-24) believed, the Hague conferences started ‘a process... which one could characterize as international law (Völkerrecht) being about to be transformed into World (domestic) Law.’ (Schücking, 1918: 73) 1899 Japan, together with some two dozens nations, among them China, Persia, Siam and Turkey, participated in the conference, ‘the first truly international assem­bl[y] meeting in time of peace for the purpose of preserving peace, not of concluding a war then in progress.’ (Hinsley, 1963: 139) It was not the worst idea of the Russian Tsar Nicolaus II, to have followed the advice of his foreign minister Muraviev, to send out invitations to the foreign representatives in St. Petersburg, to hold an international peace conference.[18]

 

            The first Hague Peace Conference

            As we had seen, Japan had been receptive to the idea of the Law of Nations but had taken a turn with Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901) and the Iwakura mission to adopt a more realistic foreign and military policy within the existing nation-state system, following western patterns. This did not mean, however, that in Japan the idea of the Law of Nations and an international order based on the rule of law had become generally discredited.

            On 25 August 1898 Motono Ichirô (1862-1918),[19] the Japanese minister in St. Petersburg, sent a cable to prime minister Ôkuma Shigenobu (1838-1922) in Tokyo, informing him about a “note” (circular letter) from foreign minister Count Muraviev, calling on all govern­ments accredited in the Russian capital, to convene an international conference:

                ‘Main reasons laid down in the note are as follows: During the last twenty years, the maintenance of peace has been considered as the object of international policy; and under the pretext of the maintenance of peace, Great Powers have formed alliances, increased and still are increasing their armaments without success: Financial burdens, resulting from it increase day by day, and injure public prosperity... If this situation continues, it will... lead to catastrophe...’[20]

            The Russian minister for Foreign Affairs ‘added that, he does not think that such a conference may produce immediate result, but he hopes that it may serve to prepare solutions for the future.’ (Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. I)

            The press and politicians, especially in Europe, were at first favourably disposed towards the idea. Hayashi Tadasu (1850-1913),[21] also minister in St. Petersburg, wired on 1 Septem­ber to Ôkuma, that at a meeting on the previous day the German secretary of state in the foreign ministry, Bernhard von Bülow, had ‘confidentially informed’ him that the ‘German Government was disposed to take into favourable consideration the proposal of the emperor of Russia...’ It is possible that the Russian government consulted the German leadership, before send­ing out the invitations.[22] On the same day Motono sent an almost euphoric cable: ‘... it appears that European press welcome Russian proposal with almost unanimity, and considers it as one of the most important acts of international policy of this cent­ury...’[23]

            Also, in the foreign ministry, on 1 September, Motono had communicated to Ôkuma the following story about the Tsar’s initiative:

              ‘... I know, there are two versions about the probable cause of the Russian proposal: (1) The emperor of Russia, deeply ani­mated by [a] sincere desire for peace, spontaneously has ordered Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to make the said proposal, and to give publicity to the document by seizing [the] opportunity of the unveiling of Alexander II at Moscow. It is said that the Empress of Russia has exercised great influence on the Emperor of Russia on the subject. (2) Russian Govern­ment being much sensible to the violent attack made by English newspapers against her ambition, and being anxious to keep friendly relations with England, have decided to manifest to the world their peaceful intention by proposing the said conference in view of appeasing [the] bad feeling on the part of the English people.’[24]

            Another reason for the Russian initiative, however, was undoubtedly the ever-increasing burden of armaments that strained the national budget.[25] Japanese economy and industry, too, suffered from this excessive spending. Although Japan had little actual relevance for European concerns, it was forced to keep up modernization of its war machine. The recent introduction of a new mechanic rifle – the first machinegun – in the French artillery and the necessity for Germany, Russia and the other powers, to follow suit by investing into the research, development and production of the new weapon, also prompted the Tsar’s decision.[26] War minister Alexei Nikolaievich Kuropatkin had estimated and demanded 60 million Roubles for modern­ization of the Russian artillery. Earlier, in spring 1898 a Polish banker, author and pacifist, Jean (Ivan) Bloch (1836-1902), who became honorary member in the council for financial affairs under Sergei Count Witte, was granted an audience by the Tsar,[27] to expound at length his views and illustrate with numerous calculations and diagrams how future wars would not only drain national budgets, but be devastating to both victor and vanquished alike. ‘Such are the consequences of the so-called armed peace of Europe - slow destruction in consequence of expenditures on preparations for war, or swift destruction in the event of war - in both events convulsions in the social order’ (Bloch 1899: 356).[28]

            Bloch’s work, ‘a veritable Das Kapital of pacifism’ (Powles, 1978: 156), was published in six volumes in spring 1898 in Russian and Polish, and a French edition came out in the same year.[29] 1899 the six volumes were published in Berlin and an abridged version in English.[30] In Japan, later in 1902 Abe Isoo (1865-1949), the “father of Japanese socialism”, dedicated several issues of the journal Rikugô Zasshi to Bloch’s work (Powles, 1978: 156).

            On 13 September Ôkuma sent to Hayashi the reply of the Japanese government, ‘to accept the proposition of the Imperial Government of Russia and to participate...’[31] On 12 January of the following year, Hayashi communicated to foreign minister Aoki Shûzô (1844-1914)[32] in Tokyo, who had taken office from Ôkuma in November the previous year, details of the Russian disarmament proposals, which included the “freezing” of armaments (point 1.), no weap­ons more dangerous than those already existing (point 2.) and no production of submarines (point 4.).[33]

            Following another circular issued by the Russian government on 30 December 1898/11 January 1999, in the beginning of 1899, enthusiasm in Europe, however, faded. And that in spite of the fact that the second Manifesto should have ‘complied more neatly with the wishes of the foreign governments’ (van den Dungen, 1983: 16-17). On 18 January Hayashi sent a cable from Berlin to Aoki: ‘I saw German Minister for Foreign Affairs today, who told me that while the Emper­or of Germany and his Government cordially sympathize humanitarian undertaking of the Emperor of Russia, he thought there would be great difficulty in arriving at practical solution of the propositions formulated in recent circular of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs...’[34] By then, or little later, apparently, in Germany, the foreign ministry, acting on orders from the Emperor, William II, had instructed the press not to report, or at least not to report favourably on the conference.[35]

            The documents in the foreign ministry’s archive in Tokyo among entries at the beginning of the year 1899 contain a copy of Leo Tolstoy’s famous “Letter to the Swedes” of 23 January 1890 (followed by a Japanese translation), from which it may be worth quoting here, as it is well known that – as had happened to the Tsar[36] – thoughtful politicians among Japanese would have been influenced by his views.[37]

                ‘Armies will disappear when public opinion brands with contempt those who, whether for advantage or from fear, sell their dignity as men and enter the ranks of those murderers dressed in fools’ clothes - called the army, when men will be ashamed to wear, as they now do, imple­ments of murder, and when the word “military” will be, what indeed it is - a term of foul abuse. Only then will armies first diminish and then quite disap­pear, and a new era in the life of humanity will commence.’[38]

            On 12 April Hayashi Tadasu is appointed chief delegate for the impending conference.[39] The instructions clarify unmistakably: ‘Europe is the center of military and naval activity and it is chiefly to deal with the situation there that the Conference is convoked.’[40]

            The most important and far-reaching project at the conference, besides disarmament, was the establishment of the Permanent International Court of Arbitration (Court Permanente d’Arbitrage, jap. jôsetsu kokusai saibanshô), the forerunner of today’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. This no doubt went to the heart of the sovereign right of nations to wage war (jus ad bellum). The Russian project for a Convention on Mediation and Arbitration comprised two areas, in which the appeal to the Court was to be obligatory, i.e., all questions of a “purely technical” nature: ‘First, question of pecuniary indemnity so far as not to touch [the] vital interest nor honour of the state; Second, [the] interpretation of the Treaties, convention on the following subjects: Post, telegraphs, railways, prevention of collision on high seas, navigation on international river and canals, patent, copyright, monetary and metric system, sanitary questions, cattle and plant disease, successions, extradition, mutual judiciary assistance, demarcation...’[41] On 7 June Sugimura Yôtarô[42] sent a cabletelegram giving all details of the Russian pro­pos­al to Tokyo. An American proposal went even further. Every government was to nominate two prominent jurists to be kept on a list made available to disputing parties in case of need; a permanent bureau was to be established for administrative purposes. The Court’s permanent seat was to be at The Hague.[43] Until 1907 the Court consisted merely of a list of judges (liste des arbitres), from which the states would chose their judges,[44] and take recourse to ‘arbitration... as the most effective, and at the same time the most equitable, means of settling disputes which diplomacy has failed to settle.’[45] Also on 7 June Aoki informs Nishi Tokujirô at The Hague that the ‘Japanese Government have no objection to the project of [a] convention for the mediation and arbitration as mentioned... provided however that all the continental powers do likewise.’[46]

            Like in most European and Western countries, there was a certain amount of popularity with regards to the Hague Conferences even in Japan, as is shown by the active support given by Princess Mori, who forwarded ‘as of date’ 6.471 signatures of Members of the Japanese “Ladies International Peace Association” to support the Peace Conference ‘to the promoters of the Association in Germany.’[47]

            The American delegate Frederick Holls relates how the Japanese set about sending the text of the Arbitration Treaty to Tokyo, which ‘involved cabling the entire text of the Treaty…, the cost of the cablegram, according to information received, being 35,000 francs. This incident … may … illustrate the completeness with which the great and enterprising Empire of the Far East entered into judicial relations with the rest of the civilized world’ (Holls, 1900: 325). 

            However, the desired unanimity to make international arbitration compulsory in certain areas of potential conflict did not come about due to some of the states’ principal objection. ‘The essence of the whole conference and the prime objective of the peace movement itself were thereby destroyed’ (van den Dungen, 1983: 33). For whatever reason the German Reich declined to make any binding commitments. This was followed by Austria-Hungary among the big powers. Thus the conference proceeded. Germany prided itself nonetheless in having contributed substantially to the laws of war (jus in bello).[48]

            Until 31 December all the powers who had participated in the Conference had signed the final document.[49] On 6 October 1900 Japan deposited its signatures on the Con­ventions and Declarations at The Hague, and on 10 Febru­ary 1901 the ratification documents were exchanged.

            For the list of judges (liste des arbitres) Motono Ichirô and Henry William Deni­son (1846-1914), the foreign office advisor, were nominated as “peace judges”.[50]

            In spite of considerable disappointment about the results of the conference, particularly among the international peace movement, the international community had ‘undergone a pro­found change with regards to its legal structure. A new age of a “world federal union” (Weltstaatenbund) had dawned’ (Schücking, 1918: 69). The participating nations had agreed to hold a second conference, to seek a solution to those unresolved problems, like the obligatory settlement of conflicts through arbitration and disarmament.

 

            Between the conferences

            In the beginning of the century in Japan a Christian-socialist movement gained strength, in­fluenced by Christian pacifist ideals, as expressed by thinkers like Uchimura Kanzô (1861-1930) around the turn of the century in his articles published in the Yorozu Chôhô, a newspaper having around 1903 a circulation of 150 000 copies, and whose editor Uchimura was (see Howes, 1978). At the same time, however, the impending conflict with Russia was already casting its shadows, a conflict, which might have been prevented, if the results of the first peace conference had been more tangible. The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war had been the result of Russian imperialist schemings, no doubt. The Frankfurter Zeitung (evening edition) wrote on 21 December (1903) about the Japanese attitude: ‘One cannot say that the Japanese so far have been hot-headed, for they have given the Russians time to make true their promise of evacuating Manchuria. Only after the deadlines for evacuation had passed, without the Russians even attempting to comply with their promise, the Japanese came out with their demand for compensations.’

            After the peace conference of 1899 the project of obligatory arbitration, which was desired by the large majority of nations, was pursued bilaterally and multilaterally and materialized in numerous treaties, i.e. outside the conference, so that the idea continued to take effect. In France in particular, prominent politicians like Pierre Marie Waldeck-Rousseau und Jean Jaurès together with Baron d’Estournelles de Constant formed a “groupe d’arbitrage” (Dülffer, 1981: 261), which had public appeal, and successfully lobbied for the idea of a judicial treatment of international conflicts in place of the traditional means of war.

            The Interparlamentary Union (IPU), a worldwide association of parliamentarians,[51] founded in 1889 (Uhlig, 1988: 65-66), which had also been instrumental in preparing for the Hague conferences, met with Japan’s interest, too, which became a full-fledged member in 1910. In 1905 the IPU recommended that ‘the Hague Conference should become the world tribunal and ...the Inter-Parliamentary Union should itself be converted into a universal legislature’ (Hinsley, 1963: 143).

            Under such programmatic forecasts eventually, the second Hague Peace conference convened (15 June - 18 October 1907). This time some fifty-one “civilized nations” participated. The ‘by far most important question’ on the agenda to be debated at the conference was the ‘general obligatorium’ in arbitration (Zorn, 1920: 67), i.e. a binding agreement to accept legal procedure to settle international disputes.

 

            The Second Peace Conference   

            This time the initiative came from the American president Theodore Roosevelt, although eventually it was the Russian Tsar who, after being defeated in the war with Japan, took over once more.

            On 24 Septem­ber 1904 president Roosevelt at a recep­tion of IPU-representatives in the White House, had declared that he wanted to convoke a conference and ‘invite other nations... to reassemble with a view to pushing toward completion the work already begun at The Hague by considering the questions which the first conference had left unsettled...’[52] In an article in the Washington Post of 4 October (Boston, report of 3 October) the U.S.-secretary of state John Hay (1838-1905)[53] had mentioned Leo Tolstoy and his religiously founded pacifism.[54] On 21 October a nine-page circular letter was sent to the foreign representatives of all the countries who had participated in the first conference, and which stated inter alia:

                ‘... enlightened public opinion and modern civilization alike demand that differences between nations should be adjucated and settled in the same manner as disputes between individuals are adjucated, namely, by arbitrament of courts in accordance with recognized principles of law...’[55]

            This statement was based on the IPU resolution passed earlier at St. Louis, and presented to the President on 24 September.

            In the beginning of December, while the war with Russia was still raging, ambassador Hioki Eki (Masu, 1861-1926)[56] sent a cable from Washington to foreign minister Komura Jutarô (1855-1911)[57] about a conversation he had had with Hay, in which the latter had given the ‘impression that he is anxious to obtain [an] early reply of [the] Japanese Government’[58] to president Roosevelt’s invitation. On 8 December the Japanese Imperial Government accepted the invitation.[59] Russia, however, whose Baltic fleet had set sail for the Far East in October and, hoping for victory, refused to accept an armistice. Another letter circulated by the “State Department” on 16 December expressed the American government’s regret over the Russian turn-down, ‘tending as it does to cause some postponement of the proposed Second Conference...’[60] Until the end of February 1905, however, some 16 sovereign powers, including Germany and Great Britain, had accepted the invitation.

             Apparently there were no further attempts to end the Russo-Japanese war by arbitration or otherwise. After the final defeat of the Russians and their fleet in the battle of Tsushima, and the signing of the peace treaty in Portsmouth on 5 September, it was now the Russians through the Russian ambassador in Washington, Baron Roman Romanovich Rosen (1849-1922),[61] who on 13 September, presenting the American president with a Memorandum for the convocation of the second conference. On 19 September Inoue Katsunosuke (1860-1929)[62] in Berlin informs prime minister Katsura Tarô (1847-1913)[63] in Tokyo about the Russian initiative.[64] Nearly six months later, on 3 April 1906, the Russian “Programme” is presented to the American secretary of state, Elihu Root (1845-1937).

            Japan now proposes that the conference be convened not before April or May 1907.[65] On 10 April the Dutch ambassador in Tokyo informs that the conference will be opened on 15 June.[66] In April, a disarmament proposal by Italian foreign minister Tommaso Tittoni (1855-1931)[67] attracts the attention of the Japa­nese,[68] and on 24 April Hayashi tells Komura in London, that the Japanese government would be willing to accede to the proposal[69] - although the Russians want to exclude the disarmament question altogether.[70] Some time later, however, the Italian government retracts, apparently because of Germany and Austria-Hungary’s objections.[71]

            In spring 1906 (16 April/9 May), however, the Russian ambassador Boris Bakhmeteff in a letter to the Japanese government stresses the ‘création la plus importante: la cour internationale d’arbitrage’ as aim of the conference, an institution, that in his opinion had already proved its worth.[72]

            Subsequent preliminary negotiations again dealt with disarmament, which had also been one of the primary objectives of the American initiative.[73] The British government also wishes ‘that the question of reduction of armaments should be included in the deliberation of [the] conference.’[74] U.S. secretary of state Elihu Root in particular regrets the Russian attitude. Had it not been Russia who at the first conference had called for disarmament in such strong terms. The Japanese ambassador in Washington ensures the American that the Japanese government most likely would not ‘have any objection’ to include the item on the agenda, ‘if an understanding [could be] reached between [the] United States and Great Britain’, which was obviously forthcoming.[75]

            In the meantime, according to Alexander von Siebold’s report from Switzerland, to foreign minister Hayashi, ‘The legal advisor of the Russian Foreign Office Monsieur von Martens has been visiting most of the Capitals of Europe and although a profound secret is kept of his object... [it] is to secure a majority for the Russian projects the program of which was communicated to the Powers.’[76] Von Siebold then offered his services for the conference, but it had already been decided that Henry W. Denison would once more accompany the appointed delegates under Tsu(d)zuki Keiroku and Satô Aimarô.[77]

            On 1 May Inouye Katsunosuke reports to Hayashi the con­tents of a debate in the German “Reichstag” of 30 April. German chancellor von Bülow had replied to a question whether it was ‘expedient’ to include the problem of the limitation of armaments: ‘At the First Conference the only decision arrived at was that Powers should carefully examine the question. German Government had done so but had found no means which in view of the great difficulties in the geographical, economical, military and political situation of the different States would be justifiable and suitable to remove these differences and to serve as a basis for an agreement.’ He had ‘no hopes that anything would come out of discussions...’[78] It was well known, however, that the German emperor, the foreign ministry and the majority in the academic community were blindly opposed to the very idea of the conferences. The Emperor had in fact commented: ‘Damit (sich der Zar) nicht vor Europa blamire, stimme ich dem Unsinn zu! Aber werde in mei­ner Praxis auch später mich nur auf Gott und mein scharfes Schwert verlassen und berufen! Ich scheiße auf die ganzen Beschlüsse!’[79]

            On 30 May the Japanese ambassador in Berlin Inouye sent a cablegram about a meeting between Tsudzuki Teitarô and foreign minister von Bülow (29. Mai), in which he participated. Von Bülow had ‘expressed a hope that Tsudzuki would have cordial relations with the German dele­gates at the Peace Conference and work [?] together hand in hand for the cause of peace. [The] Prince, on his part, would instruct the Principal German Delegate to be always in close touch with Tsudzuki.’[80] Three days later Inouye reports ‘The Emperor of Germany received me and Tsudzuki together with other members of [our] mission in audience [on] June 1st. In the course of [the] conversation [the] Emperor stated that Japan and Germany being two great military Powers, it was desirable that they should be on the footing of good understanding with each other in the forthcom­ing Peace Conference, to which the Emperor would command [the] German delegate to cooperate with Tsudzuki and to be in intimate relationship with him...’[81] Indeed, throughout the conference, the Germans hardly lost sight of the Japanese.

            An event at the end of June “caused much sensation to Japanese authorities”, when three Koreans suddenly appeared at The Hague, claiming to be delegates to the conference, and in possession of proper credentials carrying the seal of the Korean emperor Kojong.[82] The presumed delegates, and Yi Sang-sol (Yi-Sang-Sul[83]),[84] Yi Chun (Yj-Tjoune)[85] and Yi Ui-jong (Yi-Oui-Tjyong),[86] on 27 June presented a printed note to delegates (‘Leurs Excellences’), requesting an intervention on behalf of the empire of Korea, and accusing Japan: “Pouvons-nous comme pays indépendant permettre que la ruse du Japon vienne détruire les relations amicales et diplomatiques qui ont existé jusqu’a présent entre nous et les autres pays et devienne une menace constante pour la paix en Extrême Orient?”[87] On 5 July, however, the New York Herald reported that the Korean emperor had “repudiate[d] the mission and denounce[d] the credentials as forgery”[88] – in the eyes of some observers under threat from the resident Japanese. Indeed, some time after the 1899 failure of the Independence Movement under the leadership of So Chaep’il (1866-1951) – who, as a consequence of the intransigent reposition by a corrupt government, had to flee Korea with most of his followers – Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909)[89] was sent to Korea in November 1905 to negotiate a transfer of certain responsibilities to the Japanese government, i.e. mainly relating to foreign affairs.[90] Eventually the Korean government had to sign the agreement, allegedly, according to the report distributed by the Koreans at The Hague, under duress.[91]

            On 7 July Foreign minister Hayashi communicated to governor Ito Hirobumi in Seoul that he regarded the Korean campaign at The Hague technically as a casus belli (sensen no kenri).[92] At the conference, according to a telegram by Tsudzuki to Hayashi in Tokyo on 7 July, the ‘Complaint and philippics of [the] Coreans [Koreans] are not making much impression here as there are Georgians, Poles, and others who are trying the same sort of experiments.’ On the same day Tsudzuki asks whether he should, ‘acting under authority of Article I of the Agreement of November 17th, 1905, send for Coreans now here and demand to see authority under which they profess to act.’ At a semi-public meeting presided over by the American peace activist William T. Stead, the above-mentioned Yi Ui-jong gave a talk, and there was a motion from the audience for a ‘resolution expressing sympathy with [the] Coreans and reproaching [the] Japanese.’ Others, including Stead himself, ‘opposed the reproach against Japan.’ Eventually a resolution was adopted that was sympathetic to Japan and expressed ‘the wish that in some future time [an] international tribunal may be established for examining and adjudicating such cases [with the aim of] finding out [the] truths and administering justice all around.’[93] The world press was generally favourable to Japan. The following article in the New York Times on 20 July reflects what was perhaps the general sentiment among the powers at the time:

                ‘Saved by Japan from Russian conquest,[94] Corea three years ago agreed [to be] guided by Japanese advice in fiscal and other administrative matters and to conduct its foreig­n affairs through [the] Japanese Government. In return Japan was to guarantee her territorial integrity and safety of her dynasty. This arrangement was recognized by all the world. [The] Gravity of [the] offence of the Emperor of Corea [by] sending [a] delegation to La Haye unknown to Japan may be estimated if we imagine Emir Bokhara sending [some]one to ask [for an] intervention between him and the Czar or [if the] Annamese King [were to move] against France or some Indian Maharaja [was] asking La Haye to expel British rule from Hindustan. [The] Title of Japan to deal with Corea, as she has, is at least as good as that of Russia, France, England or any other power… Peace and progress of the world are of more importance than nominal independence of [a] country as a bone of international contention. We may now bid farewell of Corea as a protectorate of Japan. We may welcome it to a large measure of prosperity and progress Japan herself enjoys.”[95]

            On 19 July, as a consequence of the episode,[96] Kojong who had declared himself emperor in 1897, had to abdicate in favour of the crown prince.[97]

            In any event, the chief delegate and speaker of the Japanese delegation at the conference, Tsudzuki Keiroku,[98] represented his country ‘with admirable tact and dignity, using as occasion required, French or English with equal facility and telling effect’ (Brown Scott, 191909: 160). On 27 June Tsudzuki wired to Tokyo: ‘Russian delegation has proposed, under a skilfully veiled form, a quasi obligatory enquete internationale. German[y] will of course oppose it.’[99] The Russians evidently maintained an interest in the juridical development of the “Work of The Hague”, which may have been due partly to the eminent jurist Feodor de Martens, who had already been among the Russian chief delegates at the first conference, and involved in the arbitration project.

            It was not yet decided, what the position of Great Britain, with regards to obligatory arbitration, would be. Perhaps because it knew about Germany's negative disposition, it finally voted for the “Obligatorium” (Zorn, 1920: 71-72). Japan wanted time for reflection. Hardliners of the army faction like Katsura Tarô, who had been war minister and then prime minister most of the time between 1901 and 1913, strongly influenced the Japanese policy at The Hague. Decidedly pro-German in his outlook, he had co-founded the “Society for German Science” (Doitsu gaku kyôkai) in 1882, and was close to Kato Hiroyuki, the first president of Tokyo University and a ‘leading Japanese advocate of Social Darwinism’, as we have already seen (Wippich, 1993: 60-61). At the time, however, the moderate, French-educated Saionji Kinmochi was prime minister (from January 1906 to July 1908). But, while officially Japan had concluded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, the army and a large faction in the foreign ministry belonged ideologically to the pro-German camp. In addition, Japan had received what it considered unfair treatment from the Arbitra­tion Court in the “land­lease case” with foreign residents in Yokohama in 1905. Therefore it was ‘in order that [the] country might have fur­ther time for reflection’ (Brown Scott, 1909: 160) that Tsudzuki, against his original instructions to vote against the project of obligatory arbitration, abstained in the final vote[100] at the end of the conference’s fifth session (Commission I.) on 5 October 1907. The abstention had apparently been brought about by the persuasiveness of the French delegate Baron d’Estournelles de Constant (1852-1924) (Wild, 1973: 309). In any way, under these circum­stances, whether one was for or against Germany, there was hardly any other choice but to either vote against the “obligatorium” or to abstain, if one didn’t want to appear weak. The chance to act differently came briefly, when after the First World War Shidehara Kijûrô (1872-1951) became foreign minister.[101]

            Eventually, the large majority of states voted in favour of the principle of obligatory arbitration; it was turned down only by Germany and Austria-Hungary, who were joined by Rumania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey (Zorn, 1920: 72).

            Decidedly Philipp Zorn, professor of international law at the university of Königsberg and the only German delegate who had officially participated in both conferences, after the First World War, judged the event in the following terms:

                ‘The ... great task was the successful institution of the obligatorium. With impatient longing the world awaited its accomplishment. And that Germany did not recognize this world expectation, and even believed it had to re­pudiate it, was its prime and tragic mistake ... (Zorn, 1920: 75), an immense political miscalculation.., which must have provoked and [in fact] had the most serious consequences, yea, which today, in the horrible light of the universal conflagration of 1914 to 1918 appears a cause for the world war... (Zorn, 1920: 57)’[102]

            On 20 September Tsudzuki had cabled to Hayashi, that the conference had planned a third meeting for May 1914.[103] Japan is one of the nine members of the advisory committee founded for the purpose of preparing for the convention. The commission unanimously recognized obligatory arbitration as a guiding principle for the future.[104] The experts preparing for the third confer­ence were hoping, and working toward the end, that the principle of unanimity adopted at the second conference, would be replaced by a majority vote, in order to outvote Germany and other countries who had followed its lead.

            After the conference Tsudzuki travelled through Germany to England, where he met the British foreign minister Sir Edward Grey.[105] In June the following year the foreign ministry made public that ‘...the Imperial Government are prepared to give their consent to twelve of the thirteen Conventions. They do not, for the present, intend to sign the Convention relative to the Establishment of an International Prize Court and they have decided to withhold their agreement to the Declaration prohibiting the discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons. As to this latter Act it may be mentioned that complete unanimity among the great Powers is lacking.’[106]

 

            6. Conclusion

            The significance of the Hague conferences lies above all in that with the participation of Japan and other extra-European countries a new “concert of nations” had been anticipated and established, at least on paper. This was occasion not only of far-reaching hopes - but also irrational fears, including the fear of losing future pro­spects as a colonial power, as in the case of Ger­many. The characteristic features of this develop­ment - in positive terms - were a new internationalism (universal participation of states based on the principle of equality) and pacifism (disarmament and the pacific settlement of inter­national disputes through due process of law instead of armed struggle). Japan was in principle not ill disposed toward such overall regulation. The discord and rivalry among the powers, however, prevented Japan for the time being - and also subsequently to a great extent - from clearly articulating its preferences. The young nation did not want to expose itself unnecessarily and could not afford to show its weakness. The formula negotiated at the Conference, however - disarmament and “arbitrage” - had, as the history of its successor organizations, the League of Nations and the United Nations show, not become invalid, and remain a viable option.

 

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NOTES:

* The original research presented in this paper was first presented at the 41st INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF EASTERN STUDIES, Tokyo, on May 10th, 1996 in Tokyo. Some of the material was used for a presentation at a Symposium of the Peace History Society and the International Peace Bureau under the Hague Appeal for Peace Conference at The Hague on 14 May 1999. Japanese names are written in the traditional order, with the family name first.  

[1] In Japan Asao Naohiro (1975), and Tanaka Takeo (1975) published their theses on the subject in the seventies. For a bibliography see Toby (1984).

[2] See also Nishikawa Joken, Ka’i tsûshô kô [Topo­graphical Reflections about ‘ka’ and ‘i’], 1695, about trade with the ‘barbaric’ countries. I owe the reference to the title to Prof. Nakai Akio of Sophia Univer­sity.

[3] In the Japanese perception, until the arrival of the first Europeans, The world consisted of Honcho (... Japan), Kara (China) and Tenjiku (In­dia).’ Kara was Cathay. See Mori, 1961: 69.

[4] Ka literally means blossom”, “flower”, and is usually translated in our context as civilisation”.

[5] I means “Barbarian” or “uncivilized”. For the Japanese the Manchu, who ruled China from 1644 to 1911 and also the Mongols, who in 1268-79 conquered the Song Empire, founding the Yuan-Dynasty (until 1368) were actually uncivilised and i.

[6] Toby, 1984: 228, refers to Maru­yama Masao: ‘For it was, in Maruyama’s view, only through the catalysis of a Japan-centered vision of ka and i that the Japanese were able to transform late-Tokugawa isolationism and xeno­phobia ... into the thesis that Japan’s survival depended on the auto­nomous opening of the country to full foreign intercourse (kaikoku).’

[7] For a discussion, see Stern (1979).

[8] Miyoshi (1979: 16). Yanaga (1956: 365) paints Harris in more favourable tones: “Harris … was strongly opposed to extraterritoriality”, and “made every effort to help the Japanese to get rid of the unequal treaties.”

[9] On 17 Febru­ary in the first year of Meiji, or 17 March according to the Grego­rian Calendar, in a public notice, Japan committed itself to the effect. Nihon gaikô nenpyô narabini shuyô monjo (Chronology for the Japanese foreign policy and the most important documents), vol. I, Tokyo 1969: 33-4. Already one month previously, on 15 January or 8 February 1868, the young Emperor had officially invited the foreign representatives for the first time and made a declaration also to the same effect.

[10] In the official announcement to the imperial edict about the introduction of compulsory military service of 28 November 1872. Text in Tsunoda, DeBary and Keene (1964: 197-198). See also Strachan (1988: 49/50): Thus the moral power of the state reached its greatest possible extent: in exchange for guaranteeing the natural rights of man, the state could demand the willingness to accept disci­pline, danger and ultimately death in its defence. What transformed war­fare was therefore a revolution in the power of the state, acting in the name of the general will. Military service, from having been the lot of a small section of society, could now in theory be truly universal.’

[11]  On the history of the ‘unequal treaties’ see Jones (1931).

[12]  Named after Iwakura Tomomi (1825-83), a court noble who led the forty-eight member mission..

[13] See Miyoshi (1979: 171); further discussion in Stern (1979: 63-100); Miwa (1968). While Fukuzawa had in 1872 in his book Gakumon (Learning) ‘defended the theory of tempu jinken’ (Heaven-Bestowed Rights of Man), in his 1875 treatise Bunmeiron no gairyaku (An Outline of a Theory of Civilization) already, the law of nations was seen to be ‘a Machiavellian tool (kembô jussû)’ (Stern: 135). 

[14] According to Miwa (1968: 2) the Japanese ‘seem to have taken to this Western philosophy with complete naïveté ... [i.e.] Darwinian-Spencerian ideas of evolution and the survival of the fittest…’

[15] An extreme example of a Darwinist is Katô Hiro­yuki (1836-1916), a prominent jurist writing on and teaching the “Law of Na­tions”, who under the influence of the German school, changed from being a pro­ponent of the idea of “in­herent human rights” and con­stitut­ionalism to professing - after 1882 - social Darwinism and opposing the liber­al move­ment. Katô Hiroyuki taught at the Imperial University in Tokyo, following the teachings of the German international law professor Rudolf von Jhring.

[16] Stern (1979: 135/6). There can be no doubt that the militarists desired a “strategic foothold on the continent”, especially after the Sino-Japanese war. Clyde (1958: 306). But one even cannot assign to the military altogether bad intentions, except that – as this author would argue – they employed the wrong (military) means to achieve their ends.

[17]  Mozi was the third great original Chinese thinker besides Laozi (Lao Tse) and Confucius (Kong Qui).

[18] On the Hague peace conferences see Brown Scott (1909); Dülffer (1981); Uhlig (1988).

[19] Motono had studied in France, was minister in Belgium (1898-1901), France (1901-6) and Russia (1906-16), and foreign minister in the Terauchi cabinet from May 1916 to July 1918.

[20] Gaikô shiryôkan (Diplomatic Record Office), MT 2.4.1.2., vol. I. The first circular was issued on 12/24 August 1898.

[21] Hayashi Tadasu was Japanese foreign minister from 1891-95, then minister in China (1895/6) and Russia (1897-99). When he was ambassador at St. Peters­burg he was appointed delegate to the Hague Conference. Thereafter he was minister in London (until 1906). From 1906-08 he was foreign minister.

[22]  ‘Report which appeared in some newspapers that Russian Government consulted German Government before sending out circular, seems pretty well borne out by evidence.’ Hayashi to Ôkuma, 1.9.1898, Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. I.

[23]  Motono to Ôkuma, Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. I. Initially, the German press ‘enthusiastically received the Tsar’s Manifest’. Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 31.8.98; even the emperor William II in a speech before the Reichstag approved of the Tsar’s proposal, however, at the same time justifying German military presence in China. This outwardly favourable disposition had changed completely by 18.1.1899, all in: Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. I.

[24]  1 September, Motono to Ôkuma. And he now adds: ‘Foreign repre­sentatives do not attach great importance to the results of the conference.’ Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. I.

[25]  ‘It was largely becau­se Russia was the first of the Great Powers to find that she was being crippled by the growing armaments burden.’ Quoted in Hinsley (1963: 276).

[26]  ‘...about this new gun... it is even said that the French military authorities refused to let their Russian allies have it unless they consented to be supplied from French Govern­ment factories only at the end of three years.’ The Times, 12.12.1898, in: Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. I.

[27]  The Times, 12.12.1898, in: Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. I. See also Uhlig., (p. 243). For the most thorough investigation into Bloch and his influence on the Tsar’s Manifesto see van den Dungen (1983), e.g. (at 6).

[28]  In fact, “The Tsar received de Bloch on several occasions to hear him expound his theories, which demonstrates that the Tsar not only knew the work but showed great interest in it” (van den Dungen, 1983: 6).

[29]  La guerre. Traduction de l’ouvrage russe, 1898.

[30]  Jean de Bloch, Der zukünftige Krieg in seiner technischen, volkswirtschaftlichen und politischen Bedeutung, 6 vols., Berlin 1899; The Future of War, Toronto, W. Briggs 1900.

[31] Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. I.

[32]  Viscount, vice-foreign minister 1886-89, foreign minister 1889-91, 1898-1900, minister in Berlin 1892-97 and London 1894-95. Nish (1977: 44-58), in his book on Japanese Foreign Policy (1869-1942) speaks of the years 1896 till 1901 as the ‘Aoki Period’. ‘Aoki was probably the most Europeanised among the prominent Meiji diplomats... a bold, independent thinker...’ (Ibid.: 45). Aoki, according to Nish (Ibid.: 67), was on the other hand ‘much influenced... by the personality of Bismarck. ...diplomats like Aoki Shûzô had fallen under his spell.’ He was married to a member of the German aristocracy, Elisabeth.

[33] Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. I. Altogether there were eight Points.

[34] According to van den Dungen (1983: 28) ‘the Germans had been opposed to the Conference from the start, seeing in it only a Franco-Russian manoeuvre to deceive them.’

[35] Zorn (1920: 15-6) suggests this.

[36] Dülffer (1981: 362, n.31) gives the following information: ‘...in November 1898 Nikolaus II. read to the Empress from Tolstoy’s War and Peace...’ In fact, the Tsarina also supported de Bloch’s efforts to win over the Tsar, and decidedly contributed to the Tsar’s decision. Van den Dungen (1983: 10).

[37]  However, it should be mentioned also that Tolstoy, the ‘Christian anarchist and militant pacifist’, was not much in favour of the Hague Peace Conference, as expressed in the same letter: ‘…the conference itself can be nothing but one of those hypocritical arrangements, which, far from tending towards peace and the diminution of the evils of militarism, on the contrary, serve to hide those evils from men, by proposing evidently fallacious means of escape, and thus turning the eyes from the one safe path.’ This ‘easiest and surest way to universal disarmament’, according to the author, was ‘by individuals refusing to take part in military service… I am even of the opinion that this is the only way to escape from the ever-increasing miseries of wardom (militarism)’  (emphasis added). See also van den Dungen (1983: 21-22).

[38]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. II, hand-written, 6 pages. Tolstoy was much read among Japanese stu­dents at the time, and still is. The rather lengthy letter was also published in 1905, in a slightly different English translation, in Count Lev N. Tolstóy, Miscellaneous Letters and Essays: 439-46. The pages containing the letter in this edition I found in Tokyo’s Sophia University were still uncut!

[39] Besides Hayashi there were Motono Ichirô, Uyehara M. and Sakamoto M. who participated as delegates in the first conference. Later the jurist, and professor of international law at the Army-and-Navy School in Tokyo, Prof. Nagae Ariga, joined as advisor.

[40]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. II (emphasis added).

[41]  Special Telegram No. 35, Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. II.

[42]  Sugimura was around 1894 chargé d’affaires in Seoul und later member in the League of Nations secretariat.

[43]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. II.

[44] In September 1900 an administrative council was constituted, ‘a kind of supervisory [body attached to] the arbitration court, ... consisting of the ministers at The Hague and the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs.’ Besides there was at The Hague the “International Bureau” and the “Court Writers”. See Wehberg (1911: 21).

[45]  Article 20 of the ‘International Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes’ of 29 July 1899.

[46]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. II.

[47]  The Kobe Weekly Chronicle of 28 June 1899: 521.

[48] Schücking (1918: 70) also recognised the Court’s significance did ‘not lie in the codi­fica­tion of the ... [ius in bello], ...but in the institution of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Cour permanente d’arbitrage).

[49]  Sugimura to Aoki on 4 January 1900: ‘...all the remaining powers signed up to 12.31. although some made re­serves...’ Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.2., vol. VII.

[50]  Henry Willard Denison was born in Vermont and served from 1880 until his death as legal advisor to the foreign ministry (hôritsu kômon) in Tokyo. Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.3., vol. I.

[51]  This organization, initially made up only of elected parliamentarians, is still extant.

[52]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. I.

[53]  Allegedly, John Hay supported the “Open Door” policy in China and prevented the dissolution of the Chinese Empire in 1900.

[54]  ‘Agrees with Tolstoi’, Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. I.

[55]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. I. (empha­sis added).

[56]  Hioki Eki (Masu) was 1900-03 in China, then in the USA. In 1914 he became Japanese minister in Peking; 1920-24 ambassador in Berlin.

[57]  Komura was foreign minister from 1901-05 and 1908-11.

[58]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. I.

[59]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. I.

[60]  Circular, Department of State, Washing­ton, Hioki to Komura, 9 December 1904, Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. I.

[61] Baron Rosen joined the Asiatic Department of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs in 1872, became vice-consul at Yokohama in 1875, then secretary of the Russian mission in Tokyo (till 1884); diplomatic posts in New York (consul general), Mexico, Belgrade, Munich, Athens and Tokyo (1897-1899 and 1904); minister to the United States (1905-1911); he was one of the chief negotiators at the at the Portsmouth Peace Conference in 1905.

[62]  Inoue (or Inouye) Katsunosuke was minister for Belgium (1898) and Germany (1898-1906), where he became the first ambassador (until 1908). From 1913-16 he was ambassador in London.

[63]  Katsura Tarô was during the first Sino-Japanese war commander of the 3rd army division, war minister from 1898-1900 and from 1901-06, 1908-11 and 1912-13 prime minister.

[64]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. I.

[65]  “Correspondence Concerning the Second Hague Peace Conference”, printed documentation, Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. II.

[66]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. III.

[67]  Tittoni was the Italian minister of foreign affairs (1903-5, 1906-9, 1919-20), ambassador to France (1910-16), and played a positive role in the League of Nations Council, starting in 1920. Later, apparently, he developed sympathies for Mussolini.

[68]  There is a letter by Tittoni to Baron Romano Avezzana, ‘chargé d’affaires d’Ita­lie à Tokyo’, contain­ing concrete disarma­ment proposals. On 17 April Hayashi an­swers: ‘The Imperial Government congratulate the Italian minister for foreign affairs upon his eminently conciliatory propositions respecting limitations of armament. Although the Imperial Government fear that there is no present prospect of a general accord among the Powers on that important subject, they would have no objection to Monsieur Tittoni’s propositions in principle as an eventual mode of procedure.’ Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. III.

[69]  ‘The Japanese Government are dis­posed to give their eventual adhesion to the Italian proposition.’ Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. III.

[70]  However, Wehberg (1921: 31) writes: ‘The attempt of various Governments, particularly the English and Russian Governments, to have the question of the limitation of armaments discussed at the Second Hague Conference failed as a result of the opposition of Germany.

[71]  Komura to Hayashi, 28 April 1907: ‘British Government... have not as yet made any definite proposal... Italian proposition has been withdrawn owing to objection of Austria and Germany.’ Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. III.

[72] Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. I. (empha­sis added). There were a few cases which were dealt with by the arbitration court, in 1902 in a dispute between California and Mexico, in 1903/4 a conflict between Venezuela and Germany/Great Britain/Italy, and in 1905 between Japan and foreigners in Yokohama. Dülffer (1981: 209ff).

[73] ‘United States Government... in addi­tion ([to] questions contained in the Russian proposal) propose to consider the question of reduction or limitation of armaments.’ Aoki to Hayashi, 17. November 1906, Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. II.

[74] Komura in London to Hayashi, 26 October 1906, Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. I.

[75]  ‘I deemed it prudent to say at once as my personal opinion that it seemed to me hardly likely that the Japanese Government would have any objection if an understand­ing has been reached between United States and Great Britain.’ Aoki to Hayashi, 17.11.1906, Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. II.

[76]  He continues: ‘There seems however the intention to introduce also those questions which were brought forward during the Jap­anese Russian war. Here I have reason to suspect that an opportunity will be seized to open a critical discussion on Japan’s action... there was a tendency to question the justice of Japan’s action at Port Arthur (the attack on the Russian fleet) previous to the declaration of war... On the... quest­ion, it will be impossible for Russia to say anything, for Mr. von Martens in his work on international law maintains that a declaration of war is unnecessary for the opening of hostilities. (Russia marched in the last war with Turkey its troups into Turkey, without any previous declaration of war.)’ Copy of letter, addressed to the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, in: Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. II.

[77]  The other delegates are Major Akiyama Yoshifuru, Counter Admi­ral Shimamura Hayao, H. W. Denison, the Attachés Kurachi Tetsukichi (advisor in the foreign ministry), Yoshimura Yasozo (advisor in the war ministery) and Yamakawa Tadao (advisor in the navy ministery); Captain Moriyama Keizaburô, Kommandant Takatsuka Kyô, as well as Tatsuki Shitchita and Nagaoka Harukazu. Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. III.

[78]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. III.

[79]  Emperor William II, quoted in Dülffer (1981: 93). (‘In order not to make the Tsar look foolish before the Europeans, I agree to this nonsense! But will in actual practice afterwards only rely and call on God and my sharp sword! I don’t give a damn for the agreements!’)

[80]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. III.

[81]  Inouye to Hayashi, 2.6.07. Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. III. There is also the following report of a half-hour conversa­tion, which Tsudzuki had with the German Emperor: ‘... the German Emperor had a long talk with me lasting about thirty minutes. The General trend of which made me feel that he was trying to impress upon me possibility and the desirability as well of the close friendship and the intimate understanding between the two nations which based their greatness on the strength of their self-defence as of the strong sympathy between the two heroic peoples animated so thoroughly by military spirit and so willing to fulfil their duties towards the re­spective bodies politic. The frankness and the erudition with which he spoke coming from a Sovereign on a Gala occasion made me feel that it was something more than an ordinary after-dinner con­versa­tion.’

[82]  According to the New York Herald (Paris edition), 5.7.07. Telegram from Tsudzuki to Hayashi, 5.7.07. Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.9.-1.

[83]  Spellings in brackets are those in the printed document.

[84]  Former vice prime minister of Korea.

[85]  Former judge of the Korean High Court, who then committed suicide at The Hague.

[86]  Ex-secretary of the Korean legation in St. Petersburg.

[87]  ‘Can we, as an independent nation, allow Japanese deception to destroy the friendly diplomatic relations that existed until now between us and the other nations, by becoming a constant threat to the peace in the Far East?’

[88]  Paris edition. Already in the preliminary correspondence the question of the participation of Korea, Panama and Abyssinia had been discussed. On 24 October the Japanese ambassador Kusakabe in Rome sent a cable to Hayashi stating that Abyssinia had accepted the Russian invitation, Panama declined, and Korea had not yet answered. However, already on 26 September/9 October 1906 ambassador Bakhmeteff had communicated to Hayashi that participation of ‘Korea, Panama and Abyssinia were out of the question’. It is possible or even likely that the change of mind was caused by the Japanese objection to include Korea. Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. I. Eventually, Abyssinia also did not participate in the conference.

[89]  Richard Storry (1960: 144) characterises Ito in the following manner: ‘Ito believed … that in modernising the country Japan would be able to win the goodwill of the Koreans, provided that firmness was tempered with tact. But tact was a virtue ill regarded by most of the army leaders…’

[90] ‘(1) Abolir le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Coréen et remettre toutes les relations diplomatiques Coréennes entre les mains du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Japonais a Tokio. (2) Transformer les fonctions de Consul Japonais en Corée en celles d’Administrateur Suprême. (3) Transformer les fonctions de Consul Japonais en celles de Surintendant.’ Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.9.-1. Ito was assassinated by a Korean patriot in 1909, after resigning his post in Seoul, while on tour in Manchuria. 

[91]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.9.-1.

[92]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.9.-1.

[93]  Tsudzuki to Hayashi, 9.7.07. Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.9.-1.

[94]  On 16 October 1897 already, the English-language Kobe Weekly Chronicle (until then uncensored) wrote that “…slowly and steadily, without ostentation, [Russia] is securing paramount control over the peninsular kingdom.”

[95]  As communicated by the Japanese ambassador in Washington, Aoki, to Hayashi in Tokyo on 21.7.07.

[96]  On the evidence, it is extremely difficult to do justice to the Japanese and the Koreans both at the same time. It is certainly questionable whether Korea would have been better off under Russian rule. Apart from that, whether one accepts principles such as the Monroe Doctrine or not, the Koreans were slow to instate reforms to resist foreign superimposition when they themselves were in a position to do so, and remain an equal and friendly neighbour with Japan, following instead a totally misguided policy that was duly met by non-recognition of the major powers at The Hague in 1907. Instead of cooperating with Japan, a corrupt and backward government threw out its capable and popular reformer Dr. So Chaep’il (Philip Jaisohn, who after the failed, Japanese-sponsored coup of 1884 was exiled and became a naturalized US-citizen). While under threat of extinction by aggressive foreign interests, having taken ‘refuge’ in the premises of the Russian legation, the king declared himself an emperor. So Chaep’il, a national hero today, whose remains have only quite recently been transferred from his American resting place to Seoul, had to flee, like his Chinese fellow-sufferer Kang Yuwei, in 1899, with a great number of Korean reformers many of whom found refuge in Japan. For some background on Korea see also Miwa (1968: 7-14); Schlichtmann (1997: 165, 185-93).

[97]  According to Cumings (1997: 145) “the [Hague] convention ruled that [the Korean emperor] Kojong was no longer sovereign over Korea’s foreign relations. … the Japanese forced Kojong to abdicate, in favor of his mentally retarded son, Sunjong.”

[98]  By Tsu(d)zuki (1909: 485) see also his quote from a poem by Johann Wolfgang Goethe “Orient und Okzident”: ‘Ob von Buddha oder Christ/Nur das Licht ver­kündet ist/Es versteht sich allerwärts/­Freier Geist und freies Herz.’ (Whether by Buddha or the Christ/The light has been just revealed/Everywhere it’s understood:/A spirit free and free the heart!)

[99]  Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. III and 9.7.07. Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. IV.

[100]  I.e. the “Conven­tion rélatif à l’arbitrage obligatoire (Annèxe 72)”. See Actes et Documents, Deuxième Con­férence Inter­natio­nale de la Paix. Le Haye 15 Juin - 18 Octobre 1907. Tome II. Première Commis­sion. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Le Haye 1909, p. 82, for Tsudzukis speech.

[101] At the time of the Second Hague Peace Conference, Shidehara was chief of intelligence in the foreign ministry’s telegraphic depart­ment, and the main connection between Tokyo and the Japanese delegation at The Hague. In this way, and also having had an earlier close knowledge of the first conference – he reached London in August 1999 from Marseilles – his name is linked with the ‘work of the Hague’ (as the German jurist Walther Schüc­king called it). From 1918-1924, after Motono had died in 1918, he was on the list of judges for the Permanent Court of Arbitra­tion at The Hague, succeeding Motono and Deni­son as ‘peace judge’. Shidehara Kijûrô was an import­ant statesman, anti-militarist and pacifist, impressed with the idea of peace through law and diplomacy. After being Minis­ter at The Hague (1914/15), he became Foreign Minister in 1924, and prime minister briefly after the Second World War. See Schlichtmann (1995, 1997).

[102]  And at 73: At the end of the con­ference ‘the mood... because of the miserable results in the chief questions of the confe­rence’s work... had become most uncomfort­able... In the press and all over the world these laments and complaints resounded...’

[103]  ‘Conférence recommende aux puis­sance, réunion d’une troisième Conférence de Paix...’ Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. IV.

[104]  Tsudzuki to Hayashi, 12 October 1907, the first point: ‘La Commission est unanime ... à reconnaitre le principe de l’arbitrage obligatoire...’ Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. IV.

[105]  Tsudzuki from Paris to Hayashi, 14 November 1907: ‘Sir Edward Grey pro­mised me that he will keep in close touch with our Embassy...’ Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. VI.

[106]  Note of the foreign ministry of 19 June 1908. Gaikô shiryôkan, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. VI.

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