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Speak Sinhala / Sinhala Q and A
ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY J.R. JAYEWARDENE
LEADER OF ThE DELEGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CEYLON (SRI LANK) / AT THE
CONFERENCE FOR THE CONCLUSION AND SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH
JAPAN - SAN FRANCISCO, USA / 6TH SEPTEMBER 1951 / HIS EXCELLENCY J.R.JAYEWARDENE
IS PRESENTLY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANK
a |
I consider it a great privilege to be afforded
the opportunity of placing before this assembly
of fifty-one nations the views of the Government
of Ceylon on the draft Treaty of Peace which
we have been invited to approve. My statement
will consist of the reasons for our acceptance
of this treaty, and I shall also attempt
to meet some of the criticisms that have
been levelled against it. It is true that
I can speak only on behalf of my Government,
but I claim that I can voice the sentiments
of the people of Asia in their general attitude
towards the future of Japan. I need not deal
with the events that led to the formulation
of the final draft of the treaty which we
are considering. Mr Dulles, the American
representative, and Mr.Kellneth Younger,
the British representative, have given us
a full and fair account of those events,
beginning with the capitulation of Japan
in August 1945. It may, however, be mentioned
that there was a serious conflict of opinion
between the four major powers as to the procedure
that should be adopted to draft this treaty.
The Soviet Union insisted that the four major
powers alone - that is, the Council of Foreign
Ministers of the USA, UK, China and the USSR
-should alone undertake it, and that the
power of veto should be reserved to them
if any others were admitted for the purpose
of drafting the treaty.
The United Kingdom insisted that the Dominions
should be consulted and the United States
of America agreed with this. They also supported
consltation with all the countries that took
part in the war against Japan.
Among these countries, too, there was a difference
of opinion as to the actual terms of the
treaty actuated by various considerations,
some by a fear of the raising of a new militaristic
Japan, and others yet unable to forget the
damage and horrors caused by the Japanese
invasions.
I venture to submit that it was at the Colombo
Conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers
held in January, 1950, that for the first
time the case for a completely independent
Japan was proposed and considered. The Colombo
Conference considered Japan not as an isolated
case, but as part of the region known as
South and Southeast Asia, Containing a large
proportion of the world's wealth and population,
and consisting of countries which have only
recently regained their freedom, whose people
were still suffering as a result of centuries
of neglect. Two ideas emerged from that Conference
- one, that of an independent Japan, and
the other, the necessity for the economic
and social development of the peoples of
South and South-east Asia, to ensure which,
what is now known as the Colombo Plan was
launched.
Mr Kenneth Younger has explained how, after
that Conference, a Working Committee of Commonwealth
High Commissioners worked on a draft treaty,
and later had consultations with the American
representative, Mr Du11es.
The treaty now before us is the result of
those consultations and negotiations. It
represents some of the views that my Government
had, and some of them which it did not have.
I claim that at the present moment it represents
the largest common measure of agreement that
could be attained among the countries that
were willing to discuss peace with Japan.
The main idea that animated the Asian countries,
Ceylon, India and Pakistan, in their attitude
to Japan was that Japan should be
free. I claim that this treaty embodies that
idea in its entirety.
There are other matters which are external
to the question of Japan's freedom - namely,
should that freedom be limited to the main
islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and
Shikoku, or should it extend to several minor
islands in the neighbourhood? If not, what
should we do with those islands? Should Formosa
be returned to China in accordance with the
Cairo Declaration of 1943? If so, to which
Government of China? Should China be invited
to the Peace Treaty Conference? If so, which
Government? Should reparations be exacted
from Japan? If so, the amount. How is Japan
to defend herself until she organizes her
own defence?
On the main question of the freedom of Japan,
we were able to agree ultimately, and the
treaty embodies that agreement. On the other
matters, there were sharp differences of
opinion, and the treaty embodies the majority
views. My Government would have preferred
it if some of those quetions were answered
in a different way, but the fact that the
majority don't agree with us is no reason
why we should abstain from signing the treaty,
which contains the central concept of a free
and independent Japan.
We feel that the allied matters I mentioned
earlier are not insoluble if Japan is free,
that they are insoluble if Japan is not free.
A free Japan, through, let us say, the United
Nations organization, can discuss these problems
with the other free nations of the world
and arrive at early and satisfactory decisions.
By signing this treaty we are enabling Japan
to be in a position to do so, to enter into
a treaty of friendship with the Government
of China if she decides to recognise her,
and I am happy to state, enabling her to
enter into a treaty of peace and friendship
with India. If we do not sign this treaty,
none of these eventualities can take place,
Why is it that the peoples of Asia are anxious
that Japan should be free ? It is because
of our age-long connections with her,and
because of the high regard the subject peoples
of Asia have for Japan when she alone, among
the Asian nations, was strong and free and
we looked up to her as a guardian and friend.
I can recall incidents that occurred during
the last war, when the co-prosperity
slogan for Asia had its appeal to subject
peoples, and some of the leadders of Burma,
India, and lndonesia joined the Japanese
in the hope that thereby their beloved countries
may be liberated.
We in Ceylon were fortunate that we were
not invaded, but the damage caused by air
raids, by the stationing of enormous armies
under the South-East Asian Command, and by
the slaughter-tapping of one of our main
commodities,rubber, when we were the only
producers of natural rubber for the Allies,
entitle us to ask th1at the damage so caused
should be repaired. We do not intend to do
so, for we believe in the words of the Great
Teacher whose message has ennobled the lives
of countless millions in Asia, that (hatred
ceasesnot by hatred, but by love'. It is
the message of the Buddha, the Great Teacher,
the Founder of Buddhism, which spread a wave
of humanism through South Asia, Burma, Laos,
Cambodia, Siam, Indonesia and Ceylon, and
also northwards through the Himalayas into
Tibet,
China, and finally, Japan, which bound us
together for hundreds of years with a common
culture and heritage. This common culture
still exists, as I found on my visit to Japan
last week on my way to attend this Conference;
and from the leaders of Japan, Ministers
of State as well as private citizens, from
their priests in the temples, I gathered
the impression that the common people of
Japan are still influenced by the shadow
of that Great Teacher of peace, and wish
to follow it. We must give them that opportunity.
That is why I cannot subscribe to the views
of the delegate of the Soviet Union when
he proposes that the freedom of Japan should
be limited. The restrictions he wishes to
impose, such as the limitation on the right
of Japan to maintain such defence forces
as a free nation is entitled to, and the
other limitations he proposes, would make
this treaty not acceptable not only to the
vast majority of the delegates present here,
but even to some of the countries that have
not attended this Conference, particularly
India, who wished to go even further than
this treaty visualizes. If again the Soviet
Union wishes the islands of Ryukyu and Bonin
returned to Japan, contrary to the Cairo
and Potsdam Declarations, why should then
South Sakhalin, as well as the Kurile be
not also returned to Japan?
It is also interesting to note that the amendments
of the Soviet Union seek to insure to the
people of Japan the fundamental freedoms
of expression, of press and publication of
religious worship, of political opinion and
of public meeting - freedoms which the
people of the Soviet Union themselves would
dearly love to possess and enjoy.
The reason why, therefore, we cannot agree
to the amendments proposed by the Soviet
delegate, is that this treaty proposes to
return to Japan sovereignty, equality and
dignity, and we cannot do so if we give them
with qualifications. The purpose of the treaty
then is to make Japan free, to impose no
restrictions on Japan's recovery, to see
to it that she organizes her own military
defence against external aggression, and
internal subversion, and that until she does
so, she invites the aid of a friendly power
to protect her, and that no reparations be
exacted from her that harm her economy.
This treaty is as magnanimous as it is just
to a defeated foe.
We extend to Japan a hand of friendship,
and trust that with the closing of this chapter
in the history of man, the last page of which
we write today, and with the beginning of
the new one, the first page of which we dictate
tomorrow, her people and ours may march together
to enjoy the full dignity of human life in
peace and prosperity.